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Abstract




This thesis is composed of three chapters that examine topics related to collusion in English auc-
tions. In the first chapter, we develop a fully nonparametric identification framework and a test of
collusion in ascending bid auctions. Assuming efficient collusion, we show that the underlying distri-
butions of values can be identified despite collusive behavior when there is at least one known com-
petitive bidder. We propose a nonparametric estimation procedure for the distributions of values and a
bootstrap test of the null hypothesis of competitive behavior against the alternative of collusion. In the
second chapter, we adopt a copula-based approach to identification. We succeed in showing that joint
distribution function of private valuations is identifiable under certain conditions. Finally, we propose a
semiparametric strategy, based on Archimedean copulas, to identify and estimate the model primitives
and analyze the dependence relation between bids in English auctions. One advantage this approach
has is that it allows us to separate the estimation of the marginal distribution from the estimation of the
joint distribution of underlying bidder values. The third chapter is an empirical study of the municipal
GIC auctions, motivated by the theoretical frameworks developed in the first two chapters.
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Chapter 1
De-censoring Approach to Identification
and Estimation in English Auctions
1.1 Introduction
Collusion in auctions is an antitrust violation, but is nevertheless a pervasive phenomenon. It has
been subject to many empirical studies. However, much of the research has focused on the sealed-bid,
first-price auction format. For example, Porter and Zona (1993) and Bajari and Ye (2003) have studied
collusion in highway procurement, while Porter and Zona (1999) and Pesendorfer (2000) have studied
collusion in school milk procurement.1
There has been relatively less empirical or econometric work on collusion in open (or English)
auctions, partly because of the dominance of the sealed-bid format in public procurement and sales.2
The arrival of the Internet has greatly reduced the costs of bringing buyers and sellers together, and thus
contributed to the increase in popularity of open auctions.
In this paper, we provide a structural nonparametric identification, estimation and testing framework
for collusion in open auctions. The analysis focuses on the commonly accepted theoretic model of such
auctions, namely the button (or thermometer) model, where the price is risen continuously and bidders
1See a survey by Harrington (2008) for more examples.
2One exception is Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997), who have studied collusion is timber auctions.
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drop out irrevocably. This model is becoming increasingly relevant for the auctions conducted over the
Internet. The reason for this is the availability (and popularity) of electronic bidding agents that update
bids continuously on bidders’ behalf, which effectively implements the button model.
We make the most often exploited assumption: bidders draw their values independently (the IPV
framework), however, allowing for bidder asymmetries. As the benchmark, and also the first step in our
approach, we consider a model where there is no collusion. It is assumed that all the losing bids are
observable. The main difficulty with identification and estimation of value distributions is the censoring
problem: while the losing bids reveal bidder values, the winning value is censored. Our approach to de-
censoring is based on the Nelson-Aalen estimator originally developed in the competing risks literature.
We derive a simple formula that allows one to identify the value distribution of a particular bidder using
only its losing bids and the losing bids of its highest rival.
Our main contribution is to extend this de-censoring technique to potentially colluding bidders. We
restrict attention to collusion through cover (or phantom) bidding, a commonly used form of collusion
in auctions.3 In open auctions, the gains from collusion are maximal when the cartel members do not
bid higher than the highest dropout price of their competitive rivals. In reality, they still may bid higher
in order to conceal collusion. The exact nature of cover bidding is not needed for our analysis as only
the leading cartel bid is used. For example, we allow non-participation, where instead of submitting a
low bid, the cover bidder does not bid at all.4
Our result relies on several identifying assumptions. First, we assume that values are drawn inde-
pendently, however, allowing for nonidentical distributions. The latter is important because the cartel is
usually stronger on average than any of the non-cartel bidders.
Second, it is assumed that only one serious bid is submitted by the cartel, by a bidder that we call the
cartel leader. The cartel leader is assumed to be selected efficiently, i.e. as the bidder with the highest
valuation. This efficiency assumption is commonly made in the empirical literature on auctions, and is
also supported by auction theory, as we explain in the next section.
3Collusion in auctions can take other forms, notably a market division agreement. See Hendricks and Porter (1989).
Pesendorfer (2000) presents evidence that collusion takes different forms in highway procurement auctions in Florida and
Texas.
4See, e.g. Porter and Zona (1993) and Baldwin et al. (1997).
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Third, it is assumed that there is at least one competitive firm bidding against the cartel. This is
often the case empirically, as e.g. in Porter and Zona (1993), Porter and Zona (1999), and Baldwin et al.
(1997). Apart from this, the composition of the cartel does not need to be known. It is only important
that the cartel leader bids competitively against the non-cartel firms.5
The cartel leader’s value is censored from above by the competitive bid. At the same time, being the
maximal value among the cartel bidders, it is censored from below by the second-highest cartel value.
So unlike the competitive setup, here we have a joint censoring of the value both from above and below.
Nevertheless, we show that the value distribution can be de-censored for each bidder in the cartel.
This is because, as we show, the selection mechanism is identifiable under efficient collusion. This
identification result is constrictive in that it gives a closed-form formula for the de-censored distribution
of the values of the cartel members that is simple to estimate nonparametrically.
In our analysis, the cartel set should be understood as a suspect set. If competitive firms are mistak-
enly included in the cartel, the identification of the values of the colluders is unaffected as long as there
is at least one competitive firm outside the cartel. Empirical studies often provide direct evidence as to
who might be a potential colluder. This evidence often allows to plausibly argue that certain firms are
“clean”, i.e. did not participate in the conspiracy. Sometimes the cartel composition is known, as the
defendant in an antitrust case as in Porter and Zona (1993) and Porter and Zona (1999). However, the
strength of our approach is that it works under minimal knowledge concerning the composition of the
cartel.
As we have argued, regardless of whether a bidder is competitive or not, its value distribution is
identifiable through our de-censoring approach. This allows us to construct the counterfactual distri-
bution of its bids under competition, even if the bidder’s actual behaviour is collusive. If the bidder
is competitive, then the counterfactual and actual distributions will coincide. However, if the bidder
is collusive, we show that the counterfactual competitive bid distribution stochastically dominates the
actual collusive one. This allows us to design a formal statistical test of the null hypothesis of competi-
tive bidding against the alternative of collusive bidding. The test can be applied individually bidder by
bidder, or can be applied jointly to a group of bidders.
5It is also permissible that the fringe firms collude among themselves.
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Our test is initially developed at the individual bidder level. However, in combination with Bonferroni-
type sequential hypothesis testing such as Holm (1979), it leads to a simple estimator of the composition
of the cartel.6 In our setting, the Holm-Bonferroni procedure works as follows. First, each bidder in the
suspect set is tested and the p-value of the test recorded. Second, the p-values are ordered from smallest
to highest. The bidders are then tested sequentially at appropriately adjusted levels of significance. If
the competitive behaviour of the suspect bidder with the smallest p-value is not rejected, then the pro-
cedure terminates with no collusion found. If not, then this bidder is classified as a colluder, and the
procedure moves to the next bidder in the order. This bidder is tested at a higher level of significance,
and is included in the cartel following rejection. If no rejection occurs, then the test finds no presence
of a cartel, as it is impossible to have a single-firm cartel. Continuing in this fashion until termination,
the procedure results in an estimated cartel set with at least two bidders. The probability of one or more
false bidder inclusions in the cartel is controlled overall at a predetermined level of significance, e.g.
5%. Moreover, the estimator of the cartel set is consistent.7
Once the collusive set has been estimated, we can proceed to estimate the collusive damages. For
each colluding bidder, we can estimate its value distribution, which determines its dropout prices under
competition. This allows us to recover the distribution of the auction price if all bidders were com-
petitive, and to compare this counterfactual distribution with the actual distribution of the prices. For
example, one could estimate the average loss of revenue due to collusion, and other statistics of the loss’
distribution.
We are not aware of any previous research on nonparametric identification of collusion in open
auctions. We believe our paper is the first one to investigate this issue. Our parallel contribution is that
we propose full identification of model primitives under collusion. This can be used to address other
important policy questions such as, for example, the optimal reserve price under collusion.
6This approach is also adopted in Schurter (2017) to estimate the composition of the cartel in a first-price auction.
7Recently, Coey, Larsen, and Sweeney (2014) considered placing bounds on collusive damages and proposed an approach
based on bidder exclusion.
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Relation to the Existing Literature
A common approach in the empirical literature on collusion in auctions is to use different bid re-
sponses to exogenous variation under collusion and competition. Porter and Zona (1993) study col-
lusion in first-price highway procurement auctions conducted by the New York State Department of
Transportation. They use measures of capacity and utilization rates as explanatory variables, and de-
velop a likelihood-based model stability test across low and high bid ranks. The cartel composition is
known in their case as they have access to court records. They find that parameter estimates are sta-
ble for the competitive group, but not for the cartel, which provides strong reduced-form evidence for
collusion in the form of phantom bidding.
In another influential paper, Porter and Zona (1999) consider collusion in Ohio school milk auctions.
They find that while the probability of submitting a bid falls with distance for non-defendant diaries, it
increases for the defendants. Also, bid levels increase with distance for the non-defendants, but decrease
for the defendants. These reduced-form finding convincingly point to collusion among the defendants,
in the form territorial allocation.
Bajari and Ye (2003) adopt a structural approach in their study of collusion in highway procurement.
The essence of their approach is to derive high-level testable predictions of the competitive model such
as conditional independence and exchangeability, and build a statistical test based on these predictions.
The main structural assumption is that the cartel is efficient, as in our paper. An extension of Bajari and
Ye’s approach to English auctions is difficult because censoring of the highest valuation implies that the
dropout prices are correlated even under competition.
Aryal and Gabrielli (2013) consider a different test of collusion in first-price auctions. They exploit
the variation in the number of bidders to argue that only the true model (competition or collusion) results
in an invariant distributions of bidder values. Also for first-price auctions, Schurter (2017) exploits the
potential presence of an exogenous shifter in the level of competition, and develops a test of collusion
in first-price auctions based on the independence between the valuations and the shifter if the bidder is
competitive.
There is very little work on collusion in open English auctions. Baldwin et al. (1997) considered
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collusion in US Forest Service Timber auctions. They consider a symmetric setting where bidders
draw values from the same parametric distribution, and assume that the cartel is efficient. Within
their parametric specifications, they compare likelihoods of competitive and collusive models and find
support for collusion.
Asker (2010) estimates damages from collusion in a structural model of a knockout auction of
stamp dealer cartel. Athey and Haile (2002) is a fundamental paper on identification in auctions, and
provides a proper perspective on our identification results. Without collusion, and in the independent
private values (IPV) framework as in our paper, it is known that the asymmetric ascending bid auction is
identifiable even if only the winning bids are observable. This has been established in Athey and Haile
(2002), building on the results for competing risks in Meilijson (1981). This approach has been recently
extended by Komarova (2013). However, feasible nonparametric estimators have not been developed
due to the complex nature of the identification arguments.8 It is not known if the model is identifiable
from the winning bids in the presence of collusion.
Our estimator in the absence of collusion is based on a well-known Nelson-Aalen estimator for
models with random censoring.9 However, its application to auctions is novel as is our approach to the
identification and estimation of the value distributions under collusion.
We adopt the button model of the English auction. Haile and Tamer (2003) emphasize that losing
bids do not necessarily reflect true values because of jump bidding in many real-world open auctions.
Be this as it may in the traditional open auctions, the arrival of the Internet has opened door to new
ascending-bid auctions that, as we have argued, conform more closely to the original “button” model
considered in the theoretical literature.
Our main structural identification assumption is that the cartel is efficient. This assumption is com-
monly used in the empirical literature on auctions, e.g. Bajari and Ye (2003), Baldwin et al. (1997).
Auction theory supports it as well: Graham and Marshall (1987) show that, if the bidding cartel is
able to distribute the spoils of collusion ex ante, it can efficiently select the cartel leader using an open
8The identification using winning bids only relies on Pfaffian integral equations, which are very difficult to solve even nu-
merically. See Brendstrup and Paarsch (n.d.), who instead appeal to parametric flexible-form maximum likelihood estimation.
We should also mention that outside the IPV framework, the model is not identifiable even under symmetry. A recent paper
by Aradillas-Lo´pez, Gandhi, and Quint (2011) addresses partial identification of this model.
9See e.g. the discussion in Section 20.15 in van der Vaart (1998).
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knockout auction. In addition, Mailath and Zemsky (1991) show that efficient collusion can be sustained
through appropriate ex-post side payments between the cartel members if the values are independent,
while Hendricks, Porter, and Tan (2008) show that this continues to be true if values are affiliated.10
When cartel bidders are symmetric, a simple knockout auction exists that selects the leader efficiently
and balances the budget ex post.
1.2 Identification under Competition
In the baseline competitive model, we consider a standard independent private values (IPV) setting
where there areN bidders participating at an auction. The set of bidders is denoted asN = {1, ..., N}.
Assumption 1 (IPV). Each bidder i ∈ N draws its value independently from a cumulative distribution
Fi(·) supported on [0, v].
We allow the distributions Fi to be different across bidders, but assume that the support [0, v] is the
same for all bidders. The density of Fi is denoted as fi.
In an ascending button auction, only the dropout prices of the losing bidders are equal to valuations
in a dominant strategy equilibrium. The valuation of the winner is censored from below by the highest
dropout price among the losing bidders. For any bidder i, let Vi denote its value, and let V−i denote
the maximum value of its rivals, V−i = maxj 6=i Vj . The distribution of V−i is denoted as F−i(·). The
indicator variable wi ∈ {0, 1} is equal to 1 if bidder i wins the auction, and is equal to 0 if he loses.
If wi = 0, Vi is observable, while Vi is censored from above by V−i when wi = 1. Let gi(v|wi = 0)
be the density of i’s bids, or equivalently, the values conditional on losing the auction. It is directly
identifiable from the data.
We now show how to recover Fi. Since Vi and V−i are assumed to be independent, the Bayes rule
10However not if values are common. See Hendricks et al. (2008).
7
yields
gi(v|wi = 0) = fi(v)(1− F−i(v))
P(wi = 0)
=⇒ fi(v) = gi(v|wi = 0)P(wi = 0)
1− F−i(v) .
Dividing both sides of the last equation by 1− Fi(v), we obtain
fi(v)
1− Fi(v) =
gi(v|wi = 0)P(wi = 0)
(1− Fi(v))(1− F−i(v)) . (1)
Our key insight is that the function that appears on the right-hand side in the denominator of (1) is
directly identifiable. The independence between Vi and V−i implies that
(1− Fi(v))(1− F−i(v)) = P(min{Vi, V−i} ≥ v).
However,
Bi = min{Vi, V−i} = wiV−i + (1− wi)Vi
is in fact equal to bidder i’s actual bid (whether losing or winning), and is directly observable. Its
distribution,
Gi(v) ≡ P(Bi ≤ v),




gi(v|wi = 0)P(wi = 0)
1−Gi(v) , (2)
where the expression on the right-hand side involves only terms that can be directly estimated from the
data.
It will prove convenient to define













The left-hand side of this equation can be recognized as a full derivative, so we can integrate this
equation and recover the distribution of i’s values Fi(·). The result is given in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 (Identification under competition). Under Assumption 1, we have









This result can be viewed as an adaptation of the well-known Nelson-Aalen estimator originally
developed for cumulative hazard functions (Aalen, 1978; Nelson, 1969, 1972) to ascending auctions.
The functional that appears on the right-hand side of (3) will be used repeatedly in the sequel. It is
defined, for any two functions H1(·) and H2(·), as11













In this section, we show that the distributions of bidder valuations are identifiable even in the pres-
ence of collusion. We assume that a subset of bidders potentially forms a bidding cartel. The identifi-
cation is shown under a number of assumptions.
First, we assume that the cartel is not all inclusive. That is, it is known to the researcher that at least
11This functional is well-defined whenH1 has bounded variation.
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one bidder behaves competitively, i.e. bids up to its true value.12 Denote the set of known competitive
bidders as Ncom.
Assumption 2 (Competitive bidder). There is at least one known competitive bidder, i.e. the set Ncom
is non-empty.
We assume that some bidders may be colluding. The colluding bidders are necessarily contained in
Ncol = N\Ncom.
We shall sometimes refer to Ncol as the suspect set, as this set may also include some firms that are
in fact competitive. It is important to note that the set of actually colluding bidders C ⊆ Ncol is not a
priory known. We also allow for no collusion at all, in which case C = ∅. Our identification approach is
based on the idea that a cartel firm still behaves competitively if it is the cartel leader, i.e. the designated
highest bidder from the cartel.
Second, we restrict attention to efficient collusion, where the ring (cartel) leader is the bidder with
the highest valuation of the item.13
Assumption 3 (Efficient collusion). Cartel leader’s valuation is equal tomaxk∈C Vk.
Let `i = 1 indicate the event that bidder i has the leading (maximum) value in the suspect set Ncol,
otherwise `i = 0. This obviously includes the event when bidder i is the cartel leader under efficient
collusion, however also requires i’s value to be higher than any of the competitive bidders’ values
in Ncol. Note that together with our assumption that the distributions Fi(·) have the same support,
efficient collusion implies that each suspect member has a positive probability of being the leader, i.e.
P(`i = 1) > 0. By the Bayes rule,
fi(v|`i = 1) = P(`i = 1|Vi = v)fi(v)
P(`i = 1)
=⇒ fi(v) = P(`i = 1)fi(v|`i = 1)
P(`i = 1|Vi = v) . (5)
12This assumption can be relaxed, as we remark in the sequel.
13This assumption is plausible in empirical applications and frequently made in the literature. See e.g. Bajari and Ye (2003).
10
Conditional on being a leader, i bids competitively against the competitive fringe Ncom. This implies
that the density fi(v|`i = 1) is identifiable using the results in the previous section, i.e. by considering





be the maximum value in the competitive fringe Ncom. In parallel to (3) in the previous section, the
distribution of i’s values conditional on leading the cartel,
F `i (v) ≡ Fi(v|`i = 1),
is identifiable through the de-censoring formula







where the distributions G0,`i (b) and G
`
i(b) are now conditional on being the cartel leader,
G0,`i (b) = P(bi ≤ b, wi = 0|`i = 1), G`i(b) = P(bi ≤ b|`i = 1).
Note that both G0,`i (b) and G
`
i(b) are identifiable from the data.
Continuing the identification argument, the selection probability P(`i = 1|Vi = v) that appears in
(5) is not directly identifiable. In order to apply the above result, we propose a transformation that does




P(`i = 1)fi(v|`i = 1)
P(`i = 1|Vi = v)Fi(v) . (7)
Under independence and efficient collusion, the leader selection probability is simply the product of the
11
CDFs of bidders in Ncol\{i},




=⇒ P (`i = 1|Vi = v)Fi(v) =
∏
j∈Ncol
Fj(v) ≡ Fcol(v) (9)




Since the bidder with valuation Vcol bids competitively against the maximum value Vcom in com-






G0col(u) = P{min{Vcom, Vcol} ≤ u;wcol = 0}, Gcol(u) = P{min{Vcom, Vcol} ≤ u}.
Here wcol ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether or not the suspect leader wins the auction. Note that both G0col
and Gcol are identifiable becausemin{Vcom, Vcol} is observable.








This differential equation can be integrated backwards using the boundary condition Fi(v) = 1 to yield
a unique solution given in the proposition below, which is our main result in this section.
Proposition 2 (Identification under efficient collusion). Under Assumptions 1–3, the distributions Fi(·)
12
are identifiable. The identification of Fi(·) for the known competitive bidders is unaffected and proceeds










where the distributions F `i (v) and Fcol(v) are identifiable from the previous step according to (6) and
(10) respectively.
The intuition behind this identification result can be summarized as follows. First, even though bid-
ders in the cartel may submit noncompetitive “cover” bids, the cartel leader bids competitively against
any competitive bidder (i.e. any bidder in the set Ncom). In particular, we use the fact that it bids com-
petitively against the highest bidder in Ncom. The implication of this observation is that, conditionally
on being a cartel leader, the bidder’s behavior in the auction is in fact competitive. The de-censoring
approach can be used to identify, for any suspect bidder, the distribution of valuations conditionally on
leading the cartel.
Second, under our assumption that the cartel is efficient, the valuation of the cartel leader is censored
from below. We have shown that the de-censoring approach can be suitably extended to uncover the
marginal distribution of bidder values even in this case.
Assumption 2, which requires that there is at least one known competitive bidder, can be relaxed. If
the seller is an active participant in the auction, then the seller’s bid can be used instead of the maximum
competitive bid for the purposes of identification, as long as it is independent of the maximum cartel
value. The seller may or may not know that it is facing a cartel, and may or may not bid optimally. It
would only be required that the seller’s bids have support [b,∞) for some b ≥ 0.
1.3.1 Identifying Collusion
The result in Proposition 2 can be used as a basis for a test of collusion. Regardless of whether
bidder i ∈ Ncol is colluding or not, and regardless of the potential presence of an unknown (but efficient)
cartel, we can identify the predicted distribution of bidder i’s bids if i were competitive. It is assumed
that, if there is a cartel, it continues to operate with bidder i excluded. This (potentially counterfactual)
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distribution is denoted as Gpredi (v). As Vi, V−i are independent if bidder i is competitive, the upper
CDF of i’s bid Bi = min{Vi, V−i} is given by the product
1−Gpredi (v) = (1− Fi(v))(1− F−i(v)),
=⇒ Gpredi (v) = 1− (1− Fi(v))(1− F−i(v)). (13)
In this formula, Fi(v) is identifiable according to (12), and F−i(v), the distribution of the maximum of
all bidder values excluding bidder i, is identifiable by an analogue to (3):
F−i(v) = ψ(Gi(·|wi = 1)P(wi = 1), Gi(·))(v). (14)





It will be more convenient to use the latter expression for F−i.
The actual behavior of bidder i ∈ Ncol may be collusive. We now detail the assumptions on
the bidding strategy of a cover bidder, i.e. a cartel member who is not the cartel leader. Let h =
((i1, p1), ..., (ik, pk)) be a dropout history, where i1, ..., ik ∈ N indicate the identities of those k bidders
that have dropped out, and p1, ..., pk denote their respective dropout prices. If there are no dropouts yet,
we let h = ∅. A bidding strategy B∗i (vC , h) of a cover bidder specifies the maximum price up to which
the bidder is willing to stay in the auction, given the history h, as a function of the realization of all the
cartel valuations vC ≡ (vj)j∈C .
For the cartel to maximize the gains from collusion, it must be the case that whenever the cartel
leader wins the auction, i.e. Vcom < Vcol, the cover bidders drop out at or below Vcom. In addition,
it is reasonable to assume that the cartel members never drop out above their valuations. This way,
should the cartel leader renege on its promise to bid up to its valuation and drop out earlier, the cover
bidders will not suffer a loss from buying at prices higher than their valuations. We therefore make the
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following assumption concerning the bidding strategy of a cover bidder. Other than this assumption, a
cover bidder’s strategy is unrestricted.
Assumption 4. For any cover bidder i ∈ C, (i) its dropout price never exceeds its valuation,B∗i (vC , h) ≤
vi, and (ii) whenever the dropout history h involves the last dropout by the highest competitive bidder,
the cover bidder also drops out at that price: B∗i (vC , h) = Vcom.
Since a cover bidder never wins auctions, its actual final bid will be given by B∗i (vC , h
∗) for the
realized history h∗ after which it drops out before any other bidder does. The actual bid of a cartel
member, as a random variable, is then given by
B˜i = B
∗
i (VC , h
∗)1{`i = 0}+min{Vi, Vcom}1{`i = 1}.
For any bidder i ∈ C, Vcom ≤ V−i and therefore
min{Vi, Vcom} ≤ min{Vi, V−i}, (16)
while
B∗i (VC , h
∗) ≤ min{Vi, V−i}
by (i) and (ii) in Assumption 4. It follows that for cartel members, the counterfactual competitive
distribution of bids Gpredi (b) = P{min{Vi, V−i} ≤ b} weakly stochastically dominates the actual
distribution of bids Gi(b) = P{B˜i ≤ b}. We show below that stochastic dominance holds in the strict
sense.
Proposition 3 (Testable prediction for collusion). Under Assumptions 1-4, the predicted competitive
distribution of i’s bids is identified. Moreover, it strictly stochastically dominates the distribution of i’s
bids if bidder i is collusive: Gi(b) ≥ Gpredi (b) for all b’s, with strict inequalities for some b’s.
Proof. In order to prove that the inequality is strict for some b, by Theorem 1 in Hanoch and Levy
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(1969),14 it is sufficient to verify
E[B˜i] < E[min{Vi, V−i}]. (17)
For bidder i ∈ C, define an event Ai = {Vcom < Vi < Vcol}, and note that P(Ai) > 0, which holds
since the distributions {Fj , j ∈ N} have the same support.15 Write E[B˜i] = E[B˜i · 1(Ai)] + E[B˜i ·
1(Aci )]. For the first term by Assumption 4, we haveE[B˜i ·1(Ai)] = E[Vcom ·1(Ai)] < E[Vi ·1(Ai)] =
E[min{Vi, V−i} · 1(Ai)]. Moreover, (16) implies that E[B˜i · 1(Aci )] ≤ E[min{Vi, V−i} · 1(Aci )], and
(17) follows.
1.4 Estimation
We consider an i.i.d. sample of L auctions, with each individual auction indexed by l = 1, ..., L.
For simplicity, we assume that all N bidders participate.
The bids are denoted as bil. For each bidder i ∈ N , the maximal bid of its rival is denoted as
b−il = max {bjl : j ∈ N\{i}}. For i ∈ N , wil ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether bidder i wins auction l:
wil = 1 if bil > b−il, and wil = 0 if bil < b−il. In equilibrium, ties will have zero probability, so the
allocation rule adopted for tied bids is immaterial. Conditional on losing, i.e. on wil = 0, the bidder’s
valuation vil is revealed and equal to its bid, while for a winning bid, it is only known that the valuation
is at or above the bid: vil = bil if wil = 0, and vil ≥ bil if wil = 1.
Our estimation strategy will be based on the plug-in approach, where the distributions appearing in












1(bil ≤ b, wil = 0). (18)




H(b)dG(b) for any non-decreasing functionH(·), with a strict inequality
for at least one such function, then G0(b) < G(b) for some b. In our case, we pick the identity function, H(b) = b, which
leads to the comparison of the expected values.
15We use the notation 1(A) for the indicator function of an event A.
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Plugging these estimators into (3), we obtain an estimator for the distribution of valuations of a com-
petitive bidder i:
Fˆi(v) = ψ(Gˆi, Gˆ
0
i )(v). (19)
It can be shown, as an application of the Continuous Mapping Theorem, that the estimator Fˆi is
consistent on the entire support [0, v]. The rate of convergence can also be established by standard
methods. However, we do not pursue this, as weak convergence results and the bootstrap approach
discussed below will be our main tools for inference and testing.
Our main tool for deriving the asymptotic distributions of the estimators and their bootstrap approx-
imations will be the Functional Delta Method (FDM).16 Using the definition of the functional ψ in (4),
its functional derivative, at H1 = G
0
i and H2 = Gi, can be computed as


























where  denotes weak convergence, and Gi and G
0
i are (correlated) tight mean-zero Gaussian pro-
cesses on [0, v].17 The covariance functions of these processes can be computed as





i (v2) = G
0
i (v1 ∧ v2)−G0i (v1)G0i (v2), and
EGi(v1)G
0
i (v2) = G
0
i (v1 ∧ v2)−Gi(v1)G0i (v2). (22)
Consider any proper sub-interval [0, v0] ⊂ [0, v). The functional ψ can be shown to be Hadamard
differentiable on the space of bounded, right-continuous, left-limit (cadlag) functions on [0, v0] (with the
16See e.g. Chapter 20 of van der Vaart (1998).
17See also Lemma H.3 in the Appendix.
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derivative given by (20)). The FDM then implies weak convergence of the process
√
L(Fˆi(v)−Fi(v)),
to a tight Gaussian process on [0, v0],
√














The estimator Fˆi, together with some other estimators defined later using ψ, will be used as inputs
for construction of estimators using the de-censoring formula under collusion in (12). Because in (12)
the integral under the exponent extends up to the upper boundary of the support v, this requires that the
input estimators weakly converge on the entire support [0, v]. However, the main difficulty in obtaining
such results is that the denominator 1 − Gi(u) in (3) tends to 0 as u approaches v, and consequently,
the functional ψ is not Hadamard differentiable on the space of functions defined on the entire support
[0, v].
In order to overcome this difficulty, we propose a trimmed version of the estimator. The trimmed
estimator is denoted as F˜i(v) and is defined as
F˜i(v) ≡ Fˆi(v ∧ v¯i,L),
where v¯i,L ↑ v is the trimming sequence, and the convergence of v¯i,L is in probability. We define v¯i,L
through the quantile transformation Gˆ−1i (tL),
18 where tL ↑ 1:
v¯i,L ≡ Gˆ−1i (tL).
In other words, we trim values v using a sequence of extreme quantiles of the estimated distribution of
bids. Such a trimming scheme is convenient as it does not require estimation of the upper bound of the
support of the distribution of valuations. The trimming parameter v¯i,L has to approach the upper bound
of the support at a rate faster than L−1/2 to avoid an asymptotic bias. At the same time the rate has to
18We use the standard definition of quantile transformations: For a CDF H , H−1(t) = inf{v : H(v) ≥ t}, where
t ∈ (0, 1). In fact, since we considering distributions with compact supports, (0, 1) can be changed to [0, 1].
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be sufficiently slow to (uniformly) control the approximation error in the FDM. The assumption below
prescribes sufficient bounds on the rate.
Assumption 5. The trimming parameter tL satisfies tL = 1− L−β with 1/2 < β < 3/4.
We also make the following smoothness assumption.
Assumption 6. The CDFs Fi’s have densities fi’s, which are smooth (belong to C
∞) and bounded
away from zero on the support [0, v¯].
With these assumptions, the result in (23) can be strengthened to hold over the entire support [0, v].
Proposition 4 (Weak convergence under competition). Under Assumptions 1–6, the following weak
convergence holds for the trimmed estimators F˜i jointly for all i, over the entire support [0, v],
√
L(F˜i − Fi) ψ′(Gi,G0i ).
We now turn to estimation of the distribution of bidder valuations under collusion. Our estimation
strategy again follows the plug-in approach. It is convenient to define the expression appearing on the
right-hand side of collusion de-censoring formula (12) as a functional:













where F `i ≡ ψ(G0,`col, G`i) and Fcol ≡ ψ(G0col, Gcol).
The distributions F `i and Fcol are estimated as follows. First, we estimate the distributions G
`
i and




l=1 1(bil ≤ b, `il = 1)∑L
l=1 1(`il = 1)
, Gˆ0,`i (b) =
∑L
l=1 1(bil ≤ b, wil = 0, `il = 1)∑L
l=1 1(`il = 1)
. (24)
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1(b∗l ≤ b, wl = 0). (25)
These estimators are then plugged in to obtain the consistent estimators Fˆ `i,L and Fˆcol:




i,L), Fˆcol = ψ(Gˆ
0
col, Gˆcol). (26)
Using the trimmed estimators
F˜ `i (v) ≡ Fˆ `i (v ∧ v¯i,L), F˜col ≡ Fˆcol(v ∧ v¯col,L), (27)
where v¯col,L ≡ Gˆ−1col(tL), the estimator of Fi under collusion is defined by the plug-in approach as
F˜ coli = ψcol(F˜
`
i , F˜col). (28)
In parallel to the result in Proposition 4, one can show weak convergence on the entire support [0, v]





L(F˜ `i − F `i ) F`i ≡ ψ′(G0,`i ,G`i),
√











are (correlated) Gaussian processes that arise in the weak convergence of
the corresponding estimators:
√











and the weak convergence holds jointly with that in (21) and across i’s. The corresponding covariances
are defined similarly to those in (22). The functional derivative of ψcol, atH1 = F
`
i andH2 = Fcol, can
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be computed as
















The following proposition establishes a result analogous to that in Proposition 4, but under collu-
sion.
Proposition 5 (Weak convergence under collusion). Under Assumptions 1–6, the following weak con-
vergence holds jointly for all i’s, over any proper sub-interval [v0, v] ⊂ (0, v].
√
L(F˜ coli − Fi) ψ′col(F`i ,Fcol),
where F`i and Fcol are defined in (29).
Remark 1. The weak convergence in Proposition 5 is over any compact interval that excludes 0, the
lower boundary of the support. The reason for this is that Fcol(u)→ 0 as u ↓ 0, which creates a “small
denominator” problem: the functional ψcol is not Hadamard differentiable on the space of functions
defined on the entire support [0, v]. However, it is Hadamard differentiable on any sub-interval with
a strictly positive lower bound. This is the same difficulty encountered for the estimator Fˆi under
competition, which we resolved by trimming the support of valuations from above. We conjecture that
a similar trimming approach, now from below, would work here as well, but we do not pursue such an
extension.
In finite samples, it is unlikely to observe a cartel leader with a very small valuation. Therefore,
the estimator Fˆ coli will suffer from a substantial small sample bias for valuations v near zero. Thus,
extending Proposition 5 to the lower bound of the support is not practical.
Similarly, one can expect a substantial small sample bias for valuations v near v¯: in finite samples,
it is unlikely to observe a cartel leader with a very large valuation near the upper boundary of the
support losing to the competitive fringe. Hence, for testing purposes, we will focus below on proper
sub-intervals [v0, v0] ⊂ (0, v).
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1.4.1 Econometric Test of Collusion
We begin by testing the null hypothesis that bidder i bids competitively. The null can be stated as
H0,i : Gi(b) = G
pred
i (b) for all b. The corresponding alternative hypothesis is collusive behavior of
bidder i, which can be stated as H1,i : Gi(b) ≥ Gpredi (b) with strict inequalities for some b’s.
The basis of the test will be the deviation of the actual CDF of bids submitted in the auction Gi(b)
from the predicted competitive CDF of i’s bidsGpredi (b). Pick a compact proper sub-interval [v0, v0] ⊂











∆ˆi(b) ≡ Gˆi(b)− Gˆpredi (b)
denotes the difference between the estimated distribution of bids of bidder i and the estimated predicted




x if x > 0,
0 otherwise.
Large values of this statistic will be indicative of collusion.
Using (13) and (15), we can express the predicted (or counterfactual) CDF of bids for suspect bidder















The functional ψi,pred involves only products of CDFs and, consequently, is Hadamard differentiable.








j , Fcol). Similarly for j ∈ Ncom, Fj = ψ(G0j , Gj). Therefore, under the null of competi-
tion, a repeated application of the FDM together with Propositions 4 and 5 implies that the difference
between the estimated distributions Gˆi and Gˆ
pred







































At the same time according to Assumption 4, the statistic
√
LTˆi is divergent if bidder i participates in
the cartel.
In principle, the limiting distribution of
√
LTˆi that appears above could be computed through the
simulation of the Gaussian processesGi(b) andG
pred
i (b). However, since the covariance structure of the
limiting process is complicated due to the multi-step nature of our estimator, we propose to approximate
the null distribution of our test statistic by the bootstrap.
The bootstrap samples are generated by drawing randomly with replacement L auctions from the
original sample of L auctions. Let {(b†1l, . . . , b†Nl) : l = 1, . . . , L} be a bootstrap sample, and M be
the number of bootstrap samples. In each bootstrap sample, we construct Gˆ†i and Gˆ
0,†
i , which are the
bootstrap analogues of Gˆi and Gˆ
0
i respectively. The bootstrap version of the trimmed estimator F˜i is
given by




i )(v ∧ v¯†i,L),
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where v¯†i,L ≡ (Gˆ†i )−1(tL), and the trimming parameter tL is defined in Assumption 5.
We can similarly define the bootstrap estimators corresponding to the decensoring formula under









i , Gˆcol, and Gˆ
0
col respectively, see equations




i )(v∧v¯†i,L), and F˜ †col(v) =
ψ(Gˆ0,†col, Gˆ
†
col)(v∧ v¯†col,L) with v¯†col,L ≡ (Gˆ†col)−1(tL). Moreover, following equation (28), the bootstrap






col). We can now
define the bootstrap analogue of the counterfactual (predicted) distribution of bids of bidder i:
Gˆpred,†i = ψi,pred
(
F˜ col,†i , {F˜ col,†j }j∈Ncol\{i}, {F˜ †j }j∈Ncom
)
.
Lastly, we construct the bootstrap analogue of Tˆi:










∆ˆ†i (b) = Gˆ
†
i (b)− Gˆpred,†i (b)
is the bootstrap analogue of ∆ˆi(b).
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Let {Tˆ †i,m : m = 1, . . .M} be the collection of the bootstrap test statistics computed in bootstrap
samples 1 through M. The critical value cˆi,1−α is the (1− α)-th sample quantile of {Tˆ †i,m : m =
1, . . .M}, where α is the desired asymptotic significance level. The null hypothesis of competitive
behaviour for bidder i is rejected when Tˆi > cˆi,1−α.
Our next proposition establishes the validity of the bootstrap procedures.
19Note that to ensure a valid bootstrap approximation, we must re-center ∆ˆ†i (b) by ∆ˆi(b). The re-centering is needed to
ensure that the bootstrap version of the test statistic is generated under the null.
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Proposition 6. Under Assumptions 1–6, the following results hold jointly:
√
L(F˜ †i − Fˆi) ψ′(Gi,G0i ), v ∈ [0, v], (35)
√
L(F˜ col,†i − F˜ coli ) ψ′col(F`i ,Fcol), v ∈ [v0, v], (36)
√
L(∆ˆ†i − ∆ˆi) Gi −Gpredi , b ∈ [v0, v]. (37)
Moreover, the results also hold jointly across i’s.
Remark 2. The proof of Proposition 6 relies on the strong approximation results for the bootstrap in




i , Fcol, and G
pred
i in Proposition 6 should
be viewed as independent copies of the corresponding processes appearing in Propositions 4, 5, and
equation (33).
The validity of the bootstrap test now follows from (37) as an application of the Continuous Map-
ping Theorem.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1–6,
√





Remark 3. Consistency of the bootstrap testing procedure follows from (34) and (38) by Poly´a’s The-
orem, i.e. P(
√
LTˆi > cˆi,1−α)→ α when H0,i : Gi(b) = Gpredi (b) is true.
Our collusion test can be applied bidder by bidder to construct an estimated set of colluders (a
cartel set). However, due to the multiple hypothesis nature of this procedure, it is necessary to control
the overall probability of falsely implicating a competitive firm. This can be achieved, for example, by
using the Holm-Bonferroni sequential testing procedure that we now describe. Let α denote the overall
significance level. The procedure is performed by ordering the individual p-values from smallest to
largest,
p(1) ≤ ... ≤ p(K),
whereK is the number of suspects, i.e. the number of bidders in Ncol.
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Step 1 The firm with the smallest p-value is included in the cartel set if
p(1) < α/K,
after which one proceeds to Step 2. Otherwise the procedure stops and none of the firms are
included in the cartel.
Step 2 The firm with the second-smallest p-value is tested next. It is included in the cartel if
p(2) < α/(K − 1),
after which one proceeds to the next step. Otherwise the procedure stops and none of the firms
are included in the cartel. (The first firm that was included is now excluded as there can never be
a single-firm cartel.)
Step 3 The firm with the third-lowest p-value is tested and is included in the cartel if
p(3) < α/(K − 3),
after which one proceeds to the next step. Otherwise, the procedure stops with the two-firm cartel
(firms 1 and 2).
And so on until termination.
Once the composition of the cartel C has been estimated, we can investigate the damage caused by










This distribution can be estimated by the plug-in approach using the estimates of Fi(p) under compe-
tition for i ∈ N\Cˆ, and the estimates under collusion for i ∈ Cˆ under collusion, where Cˆ denotes the
estimated cartel set.
26
Remark 4 (Heterogeneity). We have focused on the case where the same object is auctioned. In many
applications, auction-specific heterogeneity is important. Following Haile, Hong and Shum (2003), the
standard approach in the literature is to control for heterogeneity through a first-step regression,
bil = m(xl; θ) + εil,
where the error terms εil are independent of the object characteristics xl (and are also independent across
bidders). This regression can be estimated parametrically as in Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003). Our
estimators can be applied to the homogenized bids εˆil resulting from this regression, and our bootstrap
test of collusion can be similarly performed with the homogenized bids.
1.5 Monte Carlo Experiment
In this section, we investigate the small-sample performance of our individual test in a Monte Carlo
experiment. We consider a setting with 3 bidders who draw values independently from the same distri-
bution, specified as log-normal, log Vi ∼ N(0, 1). Bidder 1 is always competitive, while bidders 2 and
3 may collude. We assume that collusion takes the following form: bidders 2 and 3 are aware of the
presence of the competitive bidder, and do not compete with each other if the competitive bidder has
dropped out. Thus, if the maximal cartel valuation max{V2, V3} > V1, the bidding stops at the price
equal to the competitive bidder’s valuation V1 even if min{V2, V3} > V1 and the price under competi-
tion would be V2. Otherwise, ifmax{V2, V3} ≤ V1, then the competitive bidder wins the auction at the
price equal to the cartel leader’s valuationmax{V2, V3}.
The estimated predicted competitive distribution when the data are generated under collusion is
reported in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. All figures contain the plots of the estimated actual bid distribution, the
true predicted competitive bid distribution, and the estimated predicted competitive bid distributions.
For the smaller sample size L = 100, both small sample bias and sample variation are clearly present.
Still, even though the estimated predicted bid distribution is not too close to the true one, for most
values it is below the actual bid distribution (i.e. shifted towards higher bids). This suggests that even
in small samples, collusion might be detectable. The situation improves dramatically for the larger
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sample, L = 400 auctions. Indeed, it is remarkable how close the estimated predicted distribution is
to the true population distribution. If the data instead are generated under competition, then the three
curves are very close to each other for the sample of L = 400 auctions; see Figure 1.3.
To evaluate size properties of our testing procedure, we simulated bids data under competition, i.e.
for all three bidders their bids are generated as
Bi = min{Vi,max
j 6=i
{Vj}}, i = 1, 2, 3.
However, when applying the de-censoring formulas and computing the test statistics in the original and
bootstrap samples, we proceeded under the assumption that bidders 2 and 3 were collusive. We expect
that in this case there should not be any significant differences between the CDF of bids for a suspected
cartel member (Gˆ) and the predicted CDF of bids under competition (Gˆpred).
For power computations, bids for cartel members (bidders 2 and 3) were generated as described in
the beginning of the section:
Bi = min{Vi, V1}, i = 2, 3.
In this case, we expect to see the CDF of bids for a suspected cartel member (Gˆ) to be positioned above
the predicted CDF of bids under competition (Gˆpred), i.e. our test should reject the null of competitive
behaviour for bidders 2 and 3 with high probability.
The results of our Monte Carlo study are summarized in Table 1.1. The table reports average
rejection rates for 1,000 Monte Carlo repetitions. To compute bootstrap critical values, we used 1,000
bootstrap samples (at each Monte Carlo replication).
The test is slightly undersized in small samples of 100 auctions. However, in moderate size samples
of 400 auctions, the rejection rates under the null of competitive behaviour are very close to the nominal
levels. The test also has very good power properties. For example in the case of collusive behaviour
for bidders 2 and 3, the 5% test rejects the null with probabilities exceeding 60% in small samples and
98% in moderate samples.20
20The test was performed for bidder 2.
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1.6 Tables
Table 1.1: Average rejection rates of the bootstrap test for collusion for different significance levels and
sample sizes (L)
significance level L = 100 L = 400 L = 100 L = 400
Competition (H0) Collusion (H1)
0.01 0.009 0.008 0.403 0.934
0.05 0.030 0.043 0.626 0.981
0.10 0.067 0.080 0.732 0.994
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1.7 Figures
















Predicted CDF under competition (estimated)
Predicted CDF under competition (population)
Figure 1.1: Suspect cartel bidder; the data are generated under collusion. The sample size is 100
auctions.
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Predicted CDF under competition (estimated)
Predicted CDF under competition (population)
Figure 1.2: Suspect cartel bidder; the data are generated under collusion. The sample size is 400
auctions.
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Predicted CDF under competition (estimated)
Predicted CDF under competition (population)
Figure 1.3: Suspect cartel bidder; the data are generated under competition. The sample size is 400
auctions.
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1.8 Appendix : Proofs
1.8.1 Extended Functional Delta Method
The following lemma is an extension of the FDM (van der Vaart, 1998, Theorem 20.8) and allows
for functionals that depend on the sample size L. This includes functionals with sample-size-dependent
trimming.
Lemma H.1 (Extended Functional Delta Method). Let D and E be normed linear spaces. Suppose
that:
(i) rL‖φL(F )− φ(F )‖ → 0, where rL →∞ as L→∞, and φL, φ : D→ E.
(ii) There is a continuous linear map φ′F,L : D→ E such that, for every compact D ∈ D0 ⊂ D,
sup
h∈D:F+h/rL∈D
∥∥∥∥φL(F + h/rL)− φL(F )1/rL − φ′F,L(h)
∥∥∥∥→ 0.
(iii) ‖φ′F,L(hL)− φ′F (h)‖ → 0 for all hL such that ‖hL − h‖ → 0 with h ∈ D0, where φ′F : D0 → E
is a continuous linear map.
(iv) GL = rL(FL − F ) G, where P (G ∈ D0) = 1.
Then, rL(φL(FL)− φ(F )) φ′F (G).
Proof. First, rL(φL(FL)−φ(F )) = rL(φL(FL)−φL(F ))+rL(φL(F )−φ(F )), where the second term
is o(1) by Condition (i) of the Lemma. Next, rL(φL(FL)−φL(F )) = rL(φL(F +GL/rL)−φL(F )) =
(φL(F + GL/rL) − φL(F ))/(1/rL) − φ′F,L(GL) + φ′F,L(GL) = op(1) + φ′F,L(GL), where the last
equality is by (ii), and the op(1) term converges in outer probability. The result now follows by (iii),
(iv) and the Extended Continuous Mapping Theorem (van der Vaart, 1998, Theorem 18.11(i)).
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1.8.2 Proofs of the Main Results
For the reasons that will be explained shortly, it will prove convenient to re-state our de-censoring
formulas using quantile transformations. For a CDF function G(·), let G−1(τ) denote its quantile





=⇒ Fi(v) = Si(Gi(v)). (40)






Using those definitions, equation (3) implies the following expression for the quantile transformation
Si(t):









The estimated version of Si(t) can be stated analogously. With Gˆi and Gˆ
0
i denoting the estimated
versions Gi and G
0




i (τ)). We have now









where Sˆi is the estimated version of Si. Thus, our quantile transformation eliminates the random
denominator in the integral expression for the estimated CDF. Note that the estimator Fˆi(v) in (19) can
be equivalently written via (40), as Fˆi(v) = Sˆi(Gˆi(v)). Moreover, one can define the trimmed version
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of the estimator Sˆi(t), where in view of Assumption 5, the trimming is applied using the sequence tL:
S˜i(t) = Sˆi(t ∧ tL)
= Fˆi(Gˆ
−1
i (t) ∧ Gˆ−1i (tL))
= Fˆi(Gˆ
−1










The following notion of continuity plays an important role in the proofs:
Definition 1. A real-valued function h is α-Ho¨lder continuous, denoted h ∈ Hα, if there are constants
C > 0 and α > 0 such that |h(x)− h(y)| ≤ C|x− y|α for all x and y in the domain of h.
The following lemma shows that the derivative of the measure µi is α-Ho¨lder continuous with
α = 1/2.








is bounded from above and away from zero, continuously differentiable on [0, 1), and α-Ho¨lder contin-
uous at t = 1 with α = 1/2.










We first show that ri(·) is continuously differentiable on the entire support [0, v], including the upper
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boundary v. We have
ri(v) =
fi(v)(1− F−i(v))

















v − v , h−i(v) =
1− F−i(v)
v − v .
Our assumption that the distributions Fi(·) have densities fi(·), smooth (C∞) and bounded away from
0 on the support [0, v], implies that hi(·) and h−i(·) are also smooth and positive on [0, v]. It follows
that ri(·) is smooth on [0, v] (including the upper boundary v).
Next, we show that G−1i (t) is Ho¨lder α-continuous with α = 1/2. Since
1−Gi(v) = (1− Fi(v)(1− F−i(v)) = hi(v)h−i(v)(v − v)2,
it follows that G′i(v) = 0 and G
′′
i (v) = −2hi(v)h−i(v) < 0. Using our assumption that the densities
fi(·) are C∞ on [0, v], the Morse Lemma21 implies that there exists a diffeomorphism q : [0, v]→ [0, 1]
(a smooth function with a smooth inverse) such that
1−Gi(v) = q(v − v)2.
Inverting this relationship yields
G−1i (t) = v − q−1(
√
1− t),
which implies that G−1i (t) is Ho¨lder α-continuous with α = 1/2 as a composition of a smooth func-
tion and
√
1− t. Finally, µ′i(t) = ri(G−1i (t)) is also Ho¨lder 1/2-continuous as a composition of a
21See Guillemin and Pollack (1974), p. 42.
continuous ri(·) and Ho¨lder 1/2-continuous G−1i (t).
The population functionsFi, Si,Gi,G
0
i , and µi as well as their estimators can be viewed as elements
of the metric space D of cadlag functions equipped with the uniform norm ‖ · ‖. Our estimation
procedure is driven by Gˆi, Gˆ
0
i , and other empirical distributions involving the bids {Bil}. The following
lemma presents important properties of those estimators, as well as those of µˆi. Let denote the weak
convergence.













, where Gi and G
0
i are two correlated Gaussian
processes on [0, v].
(b) Under Assumption 1,
√






Furthermore, P (Mi(·) ∈ Hα) = 1 for any α < 1/2.




∥∥∥√L(µˆi,L − µi)−Mi∥∥∥ <∞ a.s.
Remark 5.
(1) Part (a) of Lemma H.3 is a standard Functional CLT result for Empirical Processes, see van der
Vaart (1998), Theorem 19.5. In fact, the result holds jointly with the weak convergence in (30)
for other empirical distributions involving the bids {Bil}.
(2) The first claim in part (b) of the lemma follows from part (a) by the FDM, see van der Vaart
(1998), Lemma 20.10 and Lemma 21.3 for quantile functions. Note that Lemma H.2 implies that
µ′i is a bounded function. The α-Ho¨lder continuity result holds by (i) the α-Ho¨lder continuity




are α-Ho¨lder continuous with probability one for any α < 1/2, see for example Revuz and Yor
(1999), Theorem 2.2.
(3) Part (c) uses a point-wise approximation of empirical processes by Gaussian processes, see
van der Vaart (1998), page 268, and Ho¨lder continuity of µ′i in Lemma H.2.
Proof of Lemma H.3. To simplify the notation, we omit bidder’s index i in whenever there is no risk
of confusion.
To show part (b), for a CDF G, let q(G) = G−1 be the quantile transformation. By Lemma 21.3 in
van der Vaart (1998), the Hadamard derivative of q (tangentially to the set of continuous functions h),



















where the convergence holds in the uniform norm for all (h0L, hL)→ (h0, h) as δL → 0 tangentially to
the set of continuous functions h. This concludes the proof of the first claim in part (b).
To show the α-Ho¨lder continuity result in (b), write M(t + δ) − M(t) = G0(G−1(t + δ)) −
G
0(G−1(t)) + G(G−1(t))(µ′(t) − µ′(t + δ)) − (G(G−1(t + δ)) − G(G−1(t)))µ′(t + δ). For any
α < 1/2,
|G0(G−1(t+ δ))−G0(G−1(t))| ≤ C1|G−1(t+ δ)−G−1(t+ δ)|α ≤ C1Cα2 |δ|α,
where the first inequality follows because G0 ∈ Hα for any α < 1/2 by Theorem 2.2 in Revuz and
Yor (1999), and the second inequality holds because G−1 is continuously differentiable and, therefore,
Lipschitz. By Lemma H.2,
|G(G−1(t))(µ′(t+ δ)− µ′(t))| ≤ C|δ|1/2 supv∈[0,v] |G(v)|.
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Lastly, for any α < 1/2,
|µ′(t+ δ)(G(G−1(t+ δ))−G(G−1(t)))| ≤ C|δ|α sup
t∈[0,1]
|µ′(t)|,
where supt∈[0,1] |µ′(t)| <∞ by Lemma H.2.
To show part (c), recall that both Gˆi and Gˆ
0
i are driven by the same random variable Bil. Let
δL = 1/
√
L, and ρL = δL(logL)
2. By the last result on page 268 in van der Vaart (1998), there are








∥∥∥√L(Gˆ0 −G0)−G0∥∥∥ < ∞ a.s.. (45)
Define Gˆ =
√


















(q(G+ δLGˆ)− q(G)), (46)
where 0 ≤ δ∗L ≤ δL denotes a generic mean value.
For 0 < α < 1/2, pick L = O(ρ
1/α
L ). As in the proof of Lemma 21.3 in van der Vaart (1998),
(G+ δLGˆ)(q(G+ δLGˆ)− L)) ≤ G(q(G)) ≤ (G+ δLGˆ)(q(G+ δLGˆ)).
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Moreover,
∥∥∥Gˆ(q(G+ δLGˆ)− L))− Gˆ(q(G+ δLGˆ)))∥∥∥
≤ 2
∥∥∥Gˆ−G∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥G(q(G+ δLGˆ)− L))−G(q(G+ δLGˆ)))∥∥∥
= Op(ρL) + C
∥∥∥q(G+ δLGˆ)− L)− q(G+ δLGˆ))∥∥∥α
= Op(ρL),
where the equality in the line before the last holds by the definition of L, (44) and α-Ho¨lder continuity
of the Gaussian process and because q is Lipschitz. Therefore,







Let r(·) be as in (43). Using (46) and (47), we obtain:
∥∥∥√L(µˆ− µ)−M∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥Gˆ0(q(G+ δLGˆ))−G0(q(G))∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥r(q(G+ δ∗LGˆ))Gˆ(q(G+ δLGˆ)))− r(q(G))G(q(G))∥∥∥ .
The first term on the right-hand side can be bounded by
∥∥∥G0(q(G+ δLGˆ))−G0(q(G))∥∥∥+Op(ρL) = Op(δαL + ρL),
for any α < 1/2, where we used ‖Gˆ‖ ≤ ‖G‖+Op(ρL). The second term can be bounded by










The result in part (c) follows from the last three displays.
The following lemma establishes the weak convergence of the trimmed quantile-transformed esti-
mator S˜i(t) = Sˆi(t ∧ tL).
Lemma H.4. For t ∈ [0, 1], let














where φ′ is the functional (Hadamard) derivative of φ corresponding to µi. Define further φL(µi)(t) =
φ(µi)(t ∧ tL), φ′L(h)(t) = φ′(h)(t ∧ tL). Lastly, let
D0 = {h ∈ D[0, 1] : h ∈ Hα for any α < 1/2, h(0) = 0} . (48)
The following results hold jointly for all i’s:
(a) For all sequences hL such that ‖hL − h‖ = O(δαL) for some h ∈ D0 and 0 < α < 1/2,
∥∥∥∥φL(µi + δLhL)− φL(µi)δL − φ′L(hL)
∥∥∥∥→ 0, (49)
provided that as δL → 0 and 1− tL → 0,
δ1+αL
1− tL = O(1),
δL
(1− tL)1−α = O(1). (50)
(b) Under Assumption 1, ‖S˜i−Si‖ →p 0 and
√
L(S˜i−Si) φ′(Mi), provided that tL satisfies the
conditions in (50) with δL = 1/
√




(1) The modulus of continuity condition for h in the definition of D0 in (48) can be imposed by part
(b) of Lemma H.3.
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(2) The result in part (a) of Lemma H.4 is Hadamard differentiability tangentially to D0 for trimmed
functionals with a sample-dependent trimming. In this result, the linearization error is effectively
controlled and negligible on the expanding interval [0, tL]. Furthermore, unlike the standard
tangential Hadamard differentiability, we require that the sequences hL converge to elements of
D0 at a sufficiently fast rate, which is justified by the strong approximation rate in Lemma H.3
(c).
(3) The results in parts (b) of Lemma H.4 are the uniform consistency of the trimmed estimator of
Si for its untrimmed population counterpart, and the weak convergence of the trimmed estimator
of Si. Note that, in the weak convergence result, we use the untrimmed population object for
re-centering. Similarly, the limiting process involves the untrimmed functional φ′. Thus, the
trimming has no asymptotic effect on estimation. This is in part due to the condition
√
L(1 −
tL)→ 0, which implies that the trimming parameter tL must approach 1 at a rate faster than
√
L.
(4) The conditions on the trimming parameter tL in part (b) ensure that the approximation error in
the definition of Hadamard differentiability in (49) is negligible. The rate in the first condition is
determined by the approximation of the empirical process by Mi in Lemma H.3(c). The second
rate is driven by the α-Ho¨lder continuity of the limiting processMi.
(5) All the conditions imposed on tL in Lemma H.4 can be satisfied, for example, by choosing
1− tL = L−β , with 1/2 < β < 3/4.
as in Assumption 5. With such a choice, (1 − tL)
√
L = L−β+1/2 → 0. The first condition in
(50) holds as L−1/2(1+α)+β → 0 or β ≤ (1 + α)/2, since α can be chosen arbitrarily close to
1/2. The second condition in (50) implies β ≤ 1/(2(1 − α)) < 1, where the last inequality is
again due to the fact that α can be chosen arbitrarily close to 1/2. Hence, the second condition
in (50) is non-binding. Thus, the rate of convergence on the trimming parameter is driven mainly
by the approximation in Lemma H.3(c).
Proof of Lemma H.4. To simplify the notation, we omit bidder’s index i.
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where the second equality follows by the mean-value expansion of 1− exp(−sx) around s = 0, and δ∗L
is the mean-value: 0 ≤ δ∗L ≤ δL.




































1− t ∧ tL
)
, (52)
where the big-O term is uniform in t and we used the condition ‖hL − h‖ = O(δαL). Moreover, since




1− τ = −
h(1)− h(t ∧ tL)





































where the O(1) terms are uniform in t. Also, since S is differentiable,
sup
t∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣1− S(t ∧ tL)1− t ∧ tL
∣∣∣∣ = O(1). (54)
By (52), (53), and (54),










1− t ∧ tL +
1












(1− t ∧ tL)1/2−α
)2
,
and, since 1− tL → 0,
sup
t∈[0,1]


















where the first term in the O-expression is due to approximation of the empirical process by a Gaussian
process, and the second term is due to the α-Ho¨lder continuity of the limiting process. Next, consider





















Here, the first term in the O-expression is due to α-Ho¨lder continuity of the limiting process, and the
second term is due to the approximation of hL by a Gaussian process. Lastly, by (51), (55), and (56),

































= o(1) exp (O(1)) ,
where the last equality holds by (50).
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To show the uniform consistency in part (b), in place of hL we use Mˆ =
√
L(µˆ−µ), which satisfies
the conditions imposed on hL in part (a) of the lemma.
∥∥∥S˜L − S∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥φL(µ+ L−1/2Mˆ)− φ(µ)∥∥∥
≤





where the inequality in the last line holds by part (a) of the lemma (for the first term) and because
φL(t) = φ(t) for t ≤ tL (for the second term). Since S is differentiable with a bounded derivative, and
because for t ≥ tL we have t− tL ≤ 1− tL, the second term in (57) is of order
sup
t∈[tL,1]
(S(t)− S(tL)) = O(1− tL) = o(1). (58)
Moreover, for hL that satisfies the conditions from part (a) of the lemma, by (52) and (54) we have
sup
t∈[0,1]









)∣∣∣∣ = O (δαL) . (59)
It follows from (53), (54), and (59) that φ′L(Mˆ)(t) in (57) of order
δLO(1− t ∧ tL)Op
(
1
1− t ∧ tL
)1−α
= op(1)
uniformly in t, which concludes the proof of the uniform consistency in part (b).
To show the weak convergence result in part (b), we verify the conditions of Lemma H.1 with
rL = 1/δL =
√





where the second equality is by the conditions imposed on tL in part (b) of Lemma H.4. Condition (ii)
of Lemma H.1 has been established in part (a) of Lemma H.4. Condition (iv) holds by Lemma H.3(b).
To show that condition (iii) of Lemma H.1 holds, first note that ‖φ′L(hL)− φ′L(h)‖ → 0 for ‖hL −
h‖ = O(δαL), where the latter condition is satisfied by Mˆ with probability approaching one due to
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Lemma H.3(c) with δL = 1/
√
L:
∥∥φ′L(hL)− φ′L(h)∥∥ = sup
t∈[0,tL]







where the equality in the second line holds by (54). Next, φ′L(h)(t) − φ′(h)(t) = 0 for t ≤ tL. For
t ≥ tL,























where the equality in the last line holds by (53) and (58), and the big-O term is uniform in t. For the





































= O (1− t∗L)α +O (1− tL)α . (61)
If t∗L = 1, take the limit of the expression in (60) as t
∗
L → 1 to obtain convergence to zero due to (61),
which concludes the proof of part (b).
We can now state the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 4. Again, to simplify the notation, we omit bidder’s index i.
Write F (v) = ϕ(S,G)(v) ≡ S(G(v)). The functional ϕ is Hadamard differentiable, and its
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Hadamard derivative is equal to
ϕ′S,G(hS , hG)(v) = hS(G(v)) + S
′(G(v))hG(v),
where S′(t) denotes the derivative (density) of S at t. Therefore,
√






where the result in the second line holds by Lemma H.4(b) and Lemma H.3(a). The result in the last
line holds since S(t) = F (G−1(t)) and therefore S′(G(v)) = f(v)/g(v) Next,










where the equality in the second line holds by a change of variable u = G−1(τ). By the definition of
























where the equality in the second line holds by integration by parts. Since µ(t) = G0(G(u)), µ′(G(u)) =
g0(u)/g(u) and therefore,
µ′(G(u))dG(u) = dG0(u). (65)






(1− F (v))g(v) . (66)
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The result of the proposition now follows from (62)–(66).
Proof of Proposition 6. We omit bidder’s index i when there is no risk of confusion.
We show (35) first. Following the definition of µ in (41), we define
µˆ†(t) = Gˆ0,†((Gˆ†)−1(t)).
Following the definition of S in (39) and (42), we also define









and a trimmed bootstrap estimator



































































where the op term is uniform in τ , and therefore,
√




























Let G˜ and G˜0 denote estimators constructed using independent copies of the original data. By Proposi-
tion 3.1 in Chen and Lo (1997),
‖Gˆ† − Gˆ− G˜+G‖ = Oa.s.(L−3/4(logL)3/4),
‖Gˆ0,† − Gˆ0 − G˜0 +G0‖ = Oa.s.(L−3/4(logL)5/4).
Let µ˜ = G˜0(G˜−1), and note that µ˜ is an independent copy of µˆ. By taking the difference between (68)
and the same expansion as in (67) applied to µ˜, and applying the result of Chen and Lo (1997), we
obtain that
√
L‖µˆ† − µˆ− µ˜+ µ‖ = Oa.s.(L−1/4(logL)5/4). (69)
Let h†L =
√



























Next, let h˜L =
√





























L1/4(1− t ∧ tL)
)
, (71)




L(S˜−S) φ′(M) by Lemma H.4(b), φ′ is linear,M is Gaussian and α-Ho¨lder-continuous
for α < 1/2, and M(1) = 0, it follows that
√
L(S˜(t) − S(t))/(1 − t ∧ tL)α = Op(1) uniformly in t
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for α < 1/2, and




L(S˜(t)− S(t ∧ tL))√
L(1− S(t ∧ tL))
)





L(1− t ∧ tL)1−α
))
= (1− S(t ∧ tL))(1 + op(1)).
The equality in the last line holds by 1− tL = L−β with β < 3/4 and since α can be chosen arbitrarily














whereM† is an independent copy ofM since µ˜ is an independent copy of µˆ.
Similarly to (55) in the proof of Lemma H.4(b), since δL = 1/
√
L, and by (71),
sup
t∈[0,1]








































where the equality in the last line holds since 1− tL = L−β with β < 3/4.
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By (70), (72), (73), and (74) we have that
√
L(S˜†(t)− S˜(t)) φ′(M†(·)).
The result in (35) now follows by the FDM for the bootstrap (van der Vaart, 1998, Theorem 23.5) and
the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 4, since F˜ † = S˜†(Gˆ†).
The result in (36) holds by the bootstrap FDM, Proposition 3.1 in Chen and Lo, (29), and since the
functional ψcol is Hadamard differentiable on [v0, v] ⊂ (0, v].
To show (37), write
√




L(Gˆpred,†i (b)− Gˆpredi (b)).
The result in (37) follows by the bootstrap FDM and the previous results of the proposition as the
functional ψi,pred defined in (32) is Hadamard differentiable.
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Chapter 2
Copula-based Approach to Identification
and Estimation in English Auctions
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we propose a copula-based approach to establish identification and estimation of
model primitives within English auctions under the absence of independence. Rising interest in copula-
based methods for empirical research has given impetus to an increasing amount of literature focused
on the subject. Since then, it has been extensively used to recover and estimate linear and non-linear
association between the variables of interest since it can parametrize the link between the variables in a
joint distribution. Hence, we develop a simple approach to test for correlation among bids. Furthermore,
we succeed in showing that joint distribution function of private valuations is identifiable under certain
conditions. We will look at model specification and estimation in this setup. For estimation, we will use
a two-stage approach, first estimating the marginals, then estimating the copula function. we assume
that the copula is parametric, but the marginal distributions are nonparametric. Finally, we propose a
semiparametric strategy, based on Archimedean copulas, to identify and estimate the model primitives
and analyze the correlation between bids in English auctions. One advantage that this approach has is
that it allows us to separate the estimation of the marginal distribution from the estimation of the joint
distribution of underlying bidder values.
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2.2 Literature Review
In his seminal paper, Sklar (1959) proved that there exists a mapping between the joint distribution
and its marginals. One advantage of this approach is that there is no need of imposing any distributional
assumptions on the marginal distribution, allowing us for flexibility to model various scenarios where
a different distribution assumption is needed for each marginal in question. Moreover, it allows us to
analyze the asymptotic properties of the dependence structure of the variables. Nelsen (2006) and Joe
(1997) present a comprehensive introduction and overview of copula theory. Most of the literature on
copulas focuses on the parametric approach. Brendstrup and Paarsch (n.d.) deploy a semiparametric
approach to establish identification and estimation of in a multi-object English auction. in Hubbard, Li,
and Paarsch (2012), the authors study first-price sealed bid auctions. There is less amount of literature
focused on the nonparametric methodology, such as Sancetta and Satchell (2004), Fermanian and Scail-
let (2003), Genest and Rivest (1993).
There are numerous parametric families of bivariate copulas that have been used in a variety of ap-
plications, refer to Joe (1997), Nelsen (2006) for an overview. There is less amount of research done in
multidimensional copulas, including those for constructing higher-dimensional Archimedean copulas
(refer to Hofert and Scherer (2011)). Other studies include Oh and Patton (2012), where the authors pro-
pose a new class of factor copulas and show that they have some desirable features in high-dimensional
applications. The Fre´chet problem in higher dimensions has also been studied in the recent years - refer
to Embrechts (2009) for an overview.
In this paper, we will address the identification of English auctions, with asymmetric bidders and com-
plete set of bid information, attempting to model the correlation between bids within auctions. More
specifically, we show the identification of the true copula generator function of the joint distribution
of private values nonparametrically in the Archimedean class. Statistical uses of Archimedean copulas
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were studied in the works of Genest and MacKay (1986), Marshall and Olkin (1988), Oakes (1989).
This chapter draws partially on Fan and Liu (2013), which adopted the methodology used in Braek-
ers and Veraverbeke (2005). In Fan and Liu (2013), the authors provide identification results for a
linear quantile regression model with dependent censoring, providing the identified set and inference
procedure for the quantile regression coefficient where Archimedean copula were deployed to capture
the dependent censoring. Their identified set for the quantile regression coefficient is obtained by al-
lowing the copula function to vary within a parametric Archimedean family.
In the classical competing risks literature, Braekers and Veraverbeke (2005) demonstrate that if the
copula function is Archimedean with a known generator function, then the marginal distribution of
each potential risk can be identified from data on the failure time and cause of the failure. We will
be using a well known result in the competing risks literature, initially pioneered by Cox (1959) for
the bivariate case with independent risk, and subsequently extended by Tsiatis (1975). Hence, we will
deploy the proposed methodology in the auction paradigm, with an empirical application to data from
municipal GIC auctions in the US. Hence, we contribute to the structural auction literature by establish-
ing novel identification results using results from the competing risks literature.
In the next section, we will review the basics of copula functions, focusing our attention on the scenario
where the joint distribution of bidders’ private values is characterized by the family of Archimedean
copulas, and subsequently propose a model and methodology to recover the dependence structure of
bids in English auctions.
2.3 Copula Theory
Copula functions are used to recover the link or association between variables, both linear and
non-linear. According to the seminal work by Sklar (1959), any multidimensional distribution may be
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represented by a superposition of marginal distributions and a copula function. Thus, the joint distri-
bution of valuations can be decomposed into its constituent marginal distributions and the structure of
dependence between valuations (which we assume is given by a copula). This copula is a multivariate
distribution function with uniform marginals on [0,1], which would allow us to separate the estimation
of the marginal distributions from the estimation of the joint distribution.
Consider a random vector of two random variables (X,Y ). Denote a bivariate distribution function
H(x, y), with marginal distribution functions F (x) and G(y). According to Sklar’s theorem, there
exists a copula C :[0, 1]2 → [0, 1] such that
H(x, y) = C(F (x), G(y)), ∀(x, y) ∈ R2.
Moreover, if we assume continuity for G and F, then the copula C turns out to be unique. Otherwise,
the copula is uniquely determined only on range of G and F. In general, every continuous distribution
onRd with marginals F1(x1), ..., Fd(xd) can be represented by a d-dimensional copula,
H(x1, ..., xd) = C(F1(x1), ..., Fd(xd)).
This fact can be seen by letting C(u1, ..., un) = H(F
−1
1 (u1), ..., F
−1
d (ud)). In order to identify the
marginal distributions, we specify a copula family for the underlying joint distribution of valuations.
We will assume that the copula belongs to the Archimedean class, which allows for non-linear depen-
dence.1
Definition 2. : A copula C is said to be Archimedean if a generator ϕ : (0, 1] → (∞, 0), with
limt→0 ϕ(t) = +∞, exists such that
C(ud) = ϕ
−1(ϕ(u1) + ϕ(u2) + ...+ ϕ(ud)), ud ∈ Id.
1Among the most popular Archimedean copulas are Frank, Clayton and Ali-Mikhail-Haq.
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ensures the existence of the inverse ϕ−1 on the domain [0,+∞).2 The function ϕ: [0, 1] → [0,∞]
is called the generator of the copula C. It is a continuous, convex, strictly decreasing function with
ϕ(1) = 0.
2.4 Model
We consider a standard independent private value setting where there areN bidders participating at
an auction for a single object, whereN ≥ 2. The set of bidders is denoted byN = (1, ..., N). Bidders’
valuations of the object are private information. Each bidder i ∈ N draws its valuation Vi independently
from a cumulative distribution Fi(·), with a probability density function denoted by fi(·), on the support
[0, v]N . For any bidder i, let V−i denote the maximum value of its rivals, V−i = max
j 6=i
Vj .
In an ascending-bid auction, the dominant strategy for all bidders is to bid truthfully in the auction.
Hence, if the bidder loses in the auction, the losing bid would reveal the true value. However, should the
bidder win in the auction, the winning bid will only reveal the lower bound of their actual private value.
Therefore, the winner’s private value is not directly observed, which is equivalent to not observing the
highest bid in second price auctions.
Furthermore, we will assume that bidders know their own value distribution, but they don’t have
information about the value distribution of other bidders in the auction. Each player makes a bid based
on its beliefs about the types of other players. Each player is only given information about the status
of the bid, whether he is losing or winning; hence, each bidder can update these beliefs based on the
actions taken by the other players. The equilibrium would be reached when the bidders no longer have
an incentive to change their bid given their information about others.
Let bidders values V1 and V2, be continuous random variables. Assume that the random vector
(V1, V2) has the joint cumulative distribution function denoted by H(v1, v2), with marginals F1(v1)
2Thus, the generator function ϕ is assumed to be strict; see e.g. the discussion in Nelsen’s (2006) book.
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and F2(v2), with corresponding probability distribution functions denoted by h(v1, v2) for the joint dis-
tribution, and f1(v1) and f2(v2) for the marginals, respectively. We assume that each Vi is continuously
distributed on [v, v]n. Our objective is to recover the underlying latent valuations using the observable
bid data.
2.4.1 Copulas in the N-bidder Case
We adopt a copula-based approach to model the joint distributions, assuming that the copula belongs
to the Archimedean family.








where Fi(v) is the (marginal) distribution of i’s values. There are additional restrictions on ϕ(·) to
ensure that in fact we have a well-behaved joint distribution. Since ϕ(1) = 0, we also have the
Archimedean copula for the joint cumulative distribution function for a subset of bidders. In particular,







and the joint distribution of vi, Yi = max
j 6=i
Vj is given by









so we get the same copula representation
Fi(v, y) = ϕ
−1(ϕ(Fi(v)) + ϕ(FYi(y)))
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This means that our formula applies intact, simply replacing the other valuation by Y = max {Vj}.
2.4.2 The Identification of Marginal Distributions with Known ϕ(·)
We use a result from Tsiatis (1975) that links the cumulative distribution function ofZ = min {X,Y }
and the joint survival function
S(t1, t2) = P(X ≥ t1, Y ≥ t2).
Let δX indicate that X = min{X,Y }, and let Hu(t) = P(Z ≤ t, δx = 1).








In our case, for a fixed bidder i, we let X = Vi and Y = Yi = maxj 6=i Vj , so that Z = Bi
corresponds to the actual bid submitted by bidder i in the auction (winning or losing). We let Gi(t) be
the CDF of Z = min{Vi, Yi}, and letGi(t) denote the corresponding survival function. Hu(t) = G0i (t)
is equal to the distribution of i’s bids conditional on losing, times the probability that i loses.
Proposition 7 (Identification of Fi under competition). We have









































dt = ϕ(F i(t))− ϕF ′i(0)
= ϕ(F i(t))− ϕ(1)
= ϕ(F i(t))









and we get (76).
2.4.3 Identification of a Cartel Member Distribution
By extending an argument in LemmaD.5 , we first show the following result for Z = max {X,Y }.
Now let
F uz (t) = P(Z ≤ t, δx = 1),
where δx indicates that X = max {X,Y }.















Fx,y(t+ , t) = P (X ≤ t+ , Y ≤ t)
= P (X ≤ t, Y ≤ t)
= Fx,y(t, t) + P (t ≤ z ≤ t+ , Y ≤ t)
since if Y ≤ and X ≤ t→ z = max{X,Y } = X
(77)
Also
Fx,y(t ≤ X ≤ t+ , Y ≤ t) = Fz,δx(t ≤ z ≤ t+ , δx = 1)
because the events (t ≤ X ≤ t+ , Y ≤ t) and (t ≤ Z ≤ t+ , δx = t) are equivalent.
Moreover, since by definition
Fz,δx = (t ≤ z ≤ t+ , δx = 1) = F uz (t+ )− F uz (t)






This result can be used to identify the marginal distribution of a cartel member’s valuations Fi from
(i) F `i , the distribution of its valuations conditional on being the leader among the suspects, and (ii) the
distribution of the maximum of the valuations among the suspects. As these both distributions corre-
spond to the competitive case, they are identifiable by the method developed in the previous section.













Proof. Let X = Vi and Y = maxj∈Ncol\{i} Vj . Then the copula representation implies








At t1 = t2 = t, Fx,y(t, t) = Fcol(t) and by Lemma D.6,
∂Fx,y(t,t)
∂t1












i (t) = ϕ(1)− ϕ(Fi(t))
and (78) follows since ϕ(1) = 0.
2.4.4 Identification of ϕ(·)
Invoking theorem 4.1.5(3) in Nelson (2006), we know that if c ≥ 0, then cϕ is also a generator of
ϕ. Hence the generator ϕ is not unique, and we normalize ϕ′(1) = 1 to achieve point identification.
Consider (Vi, Vj) and (Vi, Vk) under competition
Yij = min {Vi, Vj}
Yik = min {Vi, Vk}
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are observable (as a losing bid). Letting the CDFs of Yij , Yik be
Hij = P {Yij ≤ t}
Hik = P {Yik ≤ t}
and
H lij = P {Vij ≤ t, δij = 0}





0, Vi ≤ Vj
1, otherwise
(similarly for δik). We then have


































Denote H ij(t) = u, H
−1
ij (t) = t,and denote H ij ◦H ik = Q
ϕ′(u)hij(H
−1











ik (u)) = Sik(u)
Hence ϕ′(u)Sij(u) = ϕ
′(Q(u))Sik(u)
Q(2)(u) = Q(Q(u))













2.4.5 Semiparametric Estimation of Copula under Competition
In this section, we construct a semiparametric estimator of the generator function ϕ assuming that it
belongs to a parametric family of the Archimedean class ϕθ(u), θ ∈ Θ ⊂ R. At the same time, we con-
tinue to treat the marginal distributions nonparametrically. Our approach is based on the identification
arguments in Section 2.4.4.
Pick i ∈ N , and define N−i = N\{i}. With V−i = maxj 6=i{Vj}, Bi = min{Vi, V−i}, wi =
1{Vi > V−1}, Gi(b) = P (Bi ≤ b), andG0i (b) = P (Bi ≤ b, wi = 0), we have by the results in Section
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2.4.2 that the distribution of values satisfies








where ϕ′θ(u) = ∂ϕθ(u)/∂u.
Now pick any strict subset K ⊂ N\{i} of the competitive rivals of bidder i, and let V−iK =
maxk∈K Vk be the maximum value in this subset. Let F−iK be the cumulative distribution of V−iK .
As in section 2.4.1, the joint distribution of Vi and ViK is given by a copula with the same generator
function ϕθ(·):







Note that the minimum between Vi and V−iK is observable, and denote it as Bi,K = min{Vi, V−iK}.
Define further Gi,K(b) = P (Bi,K ≤ b), wi,K = 1{Vi > V−iK}, and G0i,K(b) = P (Bi,K ≤ b, wi,K =
0). Since the generator function remains the same, we can also write the CDF of values of bidder i as








Since equations (80) and (81) identify the same CDF function Fi(v) and use the same generator ϕθ,











i,K) are different. Thus, equation (82) imposes a restriction
on ϕθ, and this restriction can be used to identify and estimate θ. In order to use this formula for a
consistent estimator of θ, we integrate up to a certain trimming threshold v˜ below the upper boundary
of support in order to avoid large bids, asGi,k(b) is close to one for those bids, and ϕ
′(·) is very large. So
these large bids would otherwise dominate the integrals on both sides, potentially causing inconsistency
in the estimation of θ.
For a given θ, the left-hand and right-hand sides of (82) can be estimated by replacing the unknown
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distributions with their empirical analogues. We allow exogenous participation in the sense thatNl and




























1(min{bil, yl} ≥ u).
This estimation equation is stated at the bidder level, so the resulting estimator θˆi will depend on the
bidder’s identity. In order to obtain a bidder-invariant estimator θˆ, we obtain the average of the estima-
tors θi across the bidders, using the empirical fractions of the number of bids submitted by bidder i as
the weights.
2.4.6 Estimation of Fi(v) under Competition and Collusion
In this second step, we use the estimator θˆ obtained in the first step to replace the unknown θ in the
generator function. Under competition, we estimate Fi(v), i ∈ Ncom (for the competitive bidders),and
Fcol(v), for the maximum value among the suspects, by replacing the distributions that appear in (80)
with their empirical analogues. Hence, we have (80)






















1(bil ≤ b, wil = 0). (85)
65















where the marginal distributions of Fcol (the maximum valuation among the suspects) and F
l
i (the
valuation of i ∈ Ncol conditional on being the leader in the set of suspects) are estimated in parallel to
(84):




































l=1 1(bil ≤ b, `il = 1)∑L
l=1 1(`il = 1)
, Gˆ0,`i (b) =
∑L
l=1 1(bil ≤ b, wil = 0, `il = 1)∑L
l=1 1(`il = 1)
. (88)
2.4.7 Predicting the Competitive Bid of Bidder i
We need the CDF:
P (min{vil, Yil ≤ v})
P (vil ≤ v) + P (Yil ≤ v)− P (vil ≤ v, Yil ≤ v) = Fi(v) + F−i(v)− C(Fi(v), F−i)
= Fi(v) + F−i(v)− ϕ−1(ϕ(Fi) + ϕ(F−i)),
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We can also write it as




Fi(v) = P (Yil ≤ v)
where Yi is the maximum of all other values.





2.5 Econometric Test of Collusion
As in Chapter 1, we follow a similar procedure to test for exhibition of collusive behaviour. As
before, we estimate the latent distribution of bidder valuations from the dataset, and simulate counter-
factuals of interest based on the estimated distribution. The null hypothesis, stated as H0,i : Gi(b) =
Gpredi (b) for all b, is that bidder i is competitive. The corresponding alternative hypothesis, stated as
H1,i : Gi(b) ≥ Gpredi (b) with strict inequalities for some b’s, is collusive behavior the bidder in ques-
tion. As before, we obtain the deviation statistic by looking at the the actual CDF of bids submitted
in the auction Gi(b) and versus the predicted competitive CDF of i’s bids G
pred
i (b). Given a compact











∆ˆi(b) ≡ Gˆi(b)− Gˆpredi (b)
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denotes the difference between the estimated distribution of bids of bidder i and the estimated predicted




x if x > 0,
0 otherwise.
Large values of this statistic will be indicative of collusion.
Using (13) and (15), we can express the predicted (or counterfactual) CDF of bids for suspect bidder















The functional ψi,pred involves only products of CDFs and, consequently, is Hadamard differentiable.




. Note that for j ∈ Ncol,
Fj = ψcol(F
`
j , Fcol). Similarly for j ∈ Ncom, Fj = ψ(G0j , Gj). Therefore, under the null of competi-
tion, a repeated application of the FDM together with Propositions 4 and 5 implies that the difference
between the estimated distributions Gˆi and Gˆ
pred








































At the same time according to Assumption 4, the statistic
√
LTˆi is divergent if bidder i participates in
the cartel.
In principle, the limiting distribution of
√
LTˆi that appears above could be computed through the
simulation of the Gaussian processesGi(b) andG
pred
i (b). However, since the covariance structure of the
limiting process is complicated due to the multi-step nature of our estimator, we propose to approximate
the null distribution of our test statistic by the bootstrap.
We generate the bootstrap samples by drawing randomly with replacement L auctions from the
original sample of L auctions. Let {(b†1l, . . . , b†Nl) : l = 1, . . . , L} be a bootstrap sample, and M be
the number of bootstrap samples. In each bootstrap sample, we construct Gˆ†i and Gˆ
0,†
i , which are the
bootstrap analogues of Gˆi and Gˆ
0
i respectively. The bootstrap version of the trimmed estimator F˜i is
given by




i )(v ∧ v¯†i,L),
where v¯†i,L ≡ (Gˆ†i )−1(tL), and the trimming parameter tL is defined in Assumption 5.
We can similarly define the bootstrap estimators corresponding to the decensoring formula under









i , Gˆcol, and Gˆ
0
col respectively, see equations




i )(v∧v¯†i,L), and F˜ †col(v) =
ψ(Gˆ0,†col, Gˆ
†
col)(v∧ v¯†col,L) with v¯†col,L ≡ (Gˆ†col)−1(tL). Moreover, following equation (28), the bootstrap






col). We can now
define the bootstrap analogue of the counterfactual (predicted) distribution of bids of bidder i:
Gˆpred,†i = ψi,pred
(




Lastly, we construct the bootstrap analogue of Tˆi:










∆ˆ†i (b) = Gˆ
†
i (b)− Gˆpred,†i (b)
is the bootstrap analogue of ∆ˆi(b).
3
Let {Tˆ †i,m : m = 1, . . .M} be the collection of the bootstrap test statistics computed in bootstrap
samples 1 through M. The critical value cˆi,1−α is the (1− α)-th sample quantile of {Tˆ †i,m : m =
1, . . .M}, where α is the desired asymptotic significance level. The null hypothesis of competitive
behaviour for bidder i is rejected when Tˆi > cˆi,1−α.
We have already established the validity and consistency of the bootstrap procedures in Proposition
6 of the first chapter, which holds here as well.
Our collusion test can be applied bidder by bidder to construct an estimated set of colluders (a
cartel set). However, due to the multiple hypothesis nature of this procedure, it is necessary to control
the overall probability of falsely implicating a competitive firm. This can be achieved, for example, by
using the Holm-Bonferroni sequential testing procedure that we now describe. Let α denote the overall
significance level. The procedure is performed by ordering the individual p-values from smallest to
largest,
p(1) ≤ ... ≤ p(K),
whereK is the number of suspects, i.e. the number of bidders in Ncol.
Step 1 The firm with the smallest p-value is included in the cartel set if
p(1) < α/K,
after which one proceeds to Step 2. Otherwise the procedure stops and none of the firms are
3Note that to ensure a valid bootstrap approximation, we must re-center ∆ˆ†i (b) by ∆ˆi(b). The re-centering is needed to
ensure that the bootstrap version of the test statistic is generated under the null.
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included in the cartel.
Step 2 The firm with the second-smallest p-value is tested next. It is included in the cartel if
p(2) < α/(K − 1),
after which one proceeds to the next step. Otherwise the procedure stops and none of the firms
are included in the cartel. (The first firm that was included is now excluded as there can never be
a single-firm cartel.)
Step 3 The firm with the third-lowest p-value is tested and is included in the cartel if
p(3) < α/(K − 3),
after which one proceeds to the next step. Otherwise, the procedure stops with the two-firm cartel
(firms 1 and 2).
And so on until termination.
Remark 6 (Heterogeneity). We have focused on the case where the same object is auctioned. In many
applications, auction-specific heterogeneity is important. Following Haile et al. (2003), the standard
approach in the literature is to control for heterogeneity through a first-step regression,
bil = m(xl; θ) + εil,
where the error terms εil are independent of the object characteristics xl (and are also independent across
bidders). This regression can be estimated parametrically as in Haile et al. (2003). Our estimators can
be applied to the homogenized bids εˆil resulting from this regression, and our bootstrap test of collusion
can be similarly performed with the homogenized bids.
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Chapter 3
Empirical Application: Internet GIC
Auctions
3.1 Introduction
Federal investigations of collusion in the municipal derivatives market have commenced in the early
1990s. However, only after the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has found evidence of collusion while
pursuing other illegal behaviours in the industry, such as “yield-burning” and “black box” deals, a full-
fledged investigation of collusion in the municipal bond industry began. This investigation ultimately
exposed extensive collusive behaviour in the municipal derivative market. At that time, IRS conducted
over twenty investigations, which revealed pervasive collusion in the industry. In December of 2006,
Charles Anderson of the IRS stated that regulators “think [they] have evidence of bid rigging”. An-
derson went on to say that, “[p]eople were winning GICs at below fair market values and there were
obviously deliberate losing bids by the losing bidders, thereby allowing the winner to win a sweetheart
deal”.1 Since then, there have been numerous alleged complaints and subsequent investigations that the
competitive bidding process is rigged as firms colluded to manipulate the bidding process in violation
of antitrust laws. Banks and firms allegedly took part in an illegal conspiracy to pay state and local
1See an article on the website of bloomberg.com published on December 7, 2006 and available at http://www
.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awq77C8cUwZA.
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governments below-market rates on GICs purchased with municipal bond proceeds, to illegally obtain
excessive profits.
Hence, in this chapter, we propose an empirical application of the methodologies outlined in the pre-
vious two chapters. Initially, we will take a look at the general institutional framework of the munic-
ipal Guaranteed Investment Contract (GIC) auctions. After obtaining an understanding of the market
environment, we will look at the methodology proposed in the first chapter, which constitutes the in-
dependent case by assuming that latent valuations are independent. Then, we propose and implement
a nonparametric estimation procedure for the distributions of values and a bootstrap test of the null
hypothesis of competitive behaviour against the alternative of collusion and apply it to our dataset. Our
framework allows for asymmetric bidders, and the test can be performed on individual bidders. While
the focus of our research is to provide a structural framework for English auctions in the presence of
collusion allegations, it is useful to compare the performance of the estimation strategies when we relax
the independence assumption and analyze the underlying dependence structure. Hence, we deploy the
copula-based approach proposed in the second chapter within which dependence between valuations is
identified (constituting the dependent case), and apply it once again to the dataset. The two approaches
developed in the previous two chapters are applied to data from Internet municipal GIC auctions. These
two frameworks would provides a benchmark to contrast the performance of a given strategy when
dependence is introduced. Based on the results obtained, we do not find evidence of collusion in our
dataset. Finally, the application of these approaches allows us to test for collusion, with the possibility
of ultimately assessing and quantifying the damages incurred as a result of collusive behavior.
3.2 The Municipal Derivatives Market
Over the past decade, Grant Street Group Inc. (GSG) has successfully provided municipalities with
an Internet auction platform. This platform has been used for bond sales, foreclosure sales, and GIC
auctions. Our dataset contains GIC auctions conducted over the Internet by GSG. The rules of the
auctions involve closed exit (as defined by Milgrom (2004)), in that bidders do not observe exit by other
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bidders. The design adopted by GSG allows bidders employ electronic bidding agents, which upgrade
their bids in small increments up to the maximum value specified by the bidder. The only information
disclosed to the bidders at any time is the status of their bid: winning or not winning. The bidders are
not provided any information about actions of other bidders participating in the auction. This makes it
a dominant strategy for a bidder to bid up to its value under competition, so that the auction conforms
closely to the button model.
It is well known that open auctions may be prone to collusion, as bidders may signal their intentions
through their behaviour in the auction. This has been documented for example in spectrum auctions,
see vivid discussions in Klemperer (2002). Marshall and Marx (2009) have recently argued that by
restricting the information flow in the open auction, the seller can inhibit collusion. This can be more
easily achieved on the Internet, as the communication protocol could be programmatically enforced.
Marshall and Marx (2009) formally show that first-best collusion cannot be achieved at an open auction
if the identities of the registrants as well as of the current highest bidder are not disclosed.2
The GSG open auction platform is marketed as a transparent mechanism that may help municipal-
ities combat bidder collusion, which had been a pervasive problem in the municipal derivative market.
In our empirical application, we employ a new dataset of auctions for municipal guaranteed investment
contracts (GICs for short). These contracts arise as a result of municipal bond issuance. Municipalities
auction off cash from bond sales to financial institutions, awarding it in whole to the bidder that offers
the highest interest rate on the investment.
Governments, states, municipalities and para-governmental organizations regularly issue municipal
bonds to fund diverse capital projects, such as construction of roads, power plants, bridges, schools,
or other public facilities. According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association,
approximately $670 billion worth of municipal bonds were issued in 2010. The total US municipal
bond market is currently valued at approximately $3.7 trillion, being one of the world’s largest security
markets.
2This is true even if the auctioneer reveals the winner’s identity. See Proposition 3 in Marshall and Marx (2009).
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Municipal bonds are initially sold either through negotiated sales, or through auctions.3 The mu-
nicipal bond’s issuer gets a cash inflow at the time of issuance, while agreeing in exchange to pay back
the principal plus the accrued interest to the bond holders over time. When these bonds are issued, the
respective funds are obtained immediately and are deposited into three types of funds: (i) project fund,
used to pay for the actual construction or repair work; (ii) sinking fund, used for making principal and
interest payments to bond holders; (iii) debt service reserve fund, used to pay debt obligations in case
of unforeseen contingencies.
However, the development of a project cannot always be timed perfectly with the expenditure plan
(for instance, there may be unpredicted delays in the construction due to external factors). As a solution,
once government obtains the proceeds from bonds, it will typically invest it in municipal derivatives
until the proceeds are needed to be expensed or paid out to bond holders.
The most common type of instrument is called a guaranteed investment contract. A GIC is compa-
rable to a hybrid of a certificate of deposit and a savings account. As a result, the issuer can earn returns
on bond proceeds (which are higher than if the funds were placed in a traditional savings account), and
maintain liquidity required for the repayment of the bond’s principal and interest accrued.
GICs are usually provided by large financial institutions such as AIG, Citicorp, UBS, Morgan Stan-
ley, Bank of America, MBIA, Goldman Sachs, and others. The government requires each bidder to
submit a bid, offering an interest rate – the highest interest rate bid gets to be the winner and acquires
the funds in the course of competitive bidding in an auction. In addition, GIC bids are thoroughly an-
alyzed either internally or by external advisors, to be certain that the complex terms of the contracts
are suitable to issuer’s specifications and requirements. Finally, the winning GIC bidder should get the
contracts issued timely and in conformity with the bid proposal.
3.2.1 Collusion in GIC Auctions
Following the IRS investigation, several US municipalities filed individual antitrust complaints with
the Department of Justice (DoJ). The leading complaint was filed by the City of Los Angeles, and
contained allegations against 37 provider defendants and 9 broker defendants, including CDR, IMAGE
3Municipal bond auctions have been studied within the structural paradigm by Shneyerov (2006) and Tang (2011).
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and Sound Capital. Since the allegations in these complaints were similar in nature, many of these
complaints were later integrated in a single Class Action Complaint (CAC), that was filed in August
2008 against more than 40 corporate defendants. The complaint was dismissed by the court, however,
citing insufficient factual evidence.4 Subsequently, a Second Class Action Complaint (SCAC) was filed
against a smaller list of defendants.5.
Up to date, 20 individuals and several corporate defendants have been indicted, including the ex-
ecutives of CDR, the largest broker. These indictments resulted in significant recent settlements, by
the defendants Bank of America ($137 million), UBS AG ($160 million), JP Morgan Chase ($228 mil-
lion), and GE Funding Capital Market Services ($70 million). See Table 3.1 for the timeline of the
investigations.
Several court documents describe the alleged bid rigging schemes in more detail. For example,
in the complaint filed by the SEC against J.P. Morgan Securities LLC (JPMS) in a district court in
July, 2011, the plaintiff alleges that JPMS, over an eight-year period, “rigged at least 93 transactions
concerning the reinvestment of proceeds from the sale of over $14.3 billion of underlying municipal
securities, generating millions of dollars in ill-gotten gams”.6 This rigging allegedly took several forms.
First, JPMS was able to win some of these auctions because it obtained advance information from a
bidding agent on the bids placed by other participants (the so-called “last looks” allegation). In one
transaction,
“Municipality C, a New Jersey entity, issued $690,000,000 of municipal bonds for the pur-
pose of, among other things, funding a portion of the state transportation system costs. In
connection with the temporary investment of the proceeds from these bonds, Municipality
C also retained the services of Bidding Agent B to bid out the FPA [forward purchase agree-
ment] for a project fund. JPMS — with the help of Bidding Agent B — won this tainted
4The original CAC complaint relied heavily on statistical analyses of bidding patterns, in particular using the IRS shortcut
that a bid may be a sham bid if it falls below 100 to 150 basis points below the winning bid. Evidently, the court adopted a
more stringent standard in its investigation, putting more emphasis on documented communication between the conspirators.
5See a recent article in Bond Buyer, available here http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/122 1/will
-market-see-more-big-rigging-cases-in-2013-1047224-1.html?zkPrintable=true, summarizes
the state of the investigations and the resulting trials and convictions as of December 31, 2012.
6This complaint can be accessed on the SEC website, at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/
2011/comp22031.pdf.
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bid through Last Looks. [...] On the morning of the bid date, a telephoned discussion en-
sued between a Bidding Agent B representative and a JPMS Marketer, in which the JPMS
Marketer asked the representative if he had heard ”anything in terms of a rate?” Bidding
Agent B’s representative responded that he hoped it would be 2.5% or better and that ”I
will give you as much help as I can with this trade.” [...] Bidding Agent B’s representative
stated that the highest bid that he had received to date was 2.7%.”
Second, JPMS participated in an arrangement where it was pre-selected as the auction winner, and
the bidding agent solicited non-winning, or courtesy, bids from some other GIC providers in order to
make the process appear competitive. Citing another transaction in the SEC complaint,
“In the fall of 2001, Municipality B sought a new FPA for the debt service reserve fund,
which its board decided would be awarded through the competitive bidding process to the
Provider submitting the bid with the highest upfront payment. JPMS, however, acting both
as agent for the Provider and essentially as the de facto Bidding Agent, rigged this bid
so that it would win the FPA, by, among other things, limiting the bid list to potential
Providers who agreed in advance to submit purposely non-winning bids. JPMS, in order
to rig this bid for itself, took advantage of the fact that the Municipality B’s chief financial
officer (”CFO”) did not want to pay fees to a Bidding Agent and instead preferred that
the prospective Providers submit their bids directly to him. However, JPMS — with the
aid of Bidding Agent B —surreptitiously assumed the role of the Bidding Agent. Indeed,
JPMS drafted the bid specifications and with the help of Bidding Agent B, created a list of
prospective Providers who agreed, in advance, to submit purposely non-winning bids.”
In addition, JPMS itself allegedly participated in submitting courtesy bids for bidding agents,
thereby allowing other providers to win:
“Transaction F was a purposely non-winning bid. A certain firm underwrote a $145,000,000
offering of revenue bonds and, on October 23, 2001, arranged for its related commercial
bank to win, through the mechanism of a fraudulent set-up, the bid for one of the instru-
ments in which the offering proceeds would be invested. To facilitate the rigging of this
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transaction, Bidding Agent A secured a purposely non-winning bid from JPMS. JPMS
knew it was being asked to submit a non-winning bid, and, a JPMS Marketer needed Bid-
ding Agent A’s help to formulate its bid not only to ensure
A bidding agent, or broker, acts on the behalf of the municipality and administers the
auction process. In particular, in order to preserve a tax-its bid was in an appropriate range,
but also to ensure its bid would not win.”
exempt status of the investment income, IRS regulations require that the investment be purchased at a
fair market value. The role of the bidding agent is to ensure that this is in fact the case. In particular, the
aforementioned regulations stipulate that, in order for the bidding process to be deemed competitive, at
least three serious bids should be available. Moreover, the solicitation should be made in good faith. But
in the allegations, the bidding agents sometimes facilitated collusion rather than enhanced competition.
In the JPSM case, the above mentioned SEC complaint alleged that:
“In July 2000, JPMS underwrote a $55,000,000 offering of revenue bonds and caused
Municipality A, a California entity, to select Bidding Agent A as its Bidding Agent. As
agreed upon with JPMS, in return for this business, Bidding Agent A restricted the list
of prospective bidders and afforded JPMS Last Looks with respect to two bids for the
temporary investment of proceeds of the aforementioned bonds.[...] In addition, in October
2000, after the responsible JPMS banker had left JPMS’s employ, Bidding Agent A paid
him approximately $19,600 in cash for causing Municipality A to select Bidding Agent A
as the Bidding Agent.”
The evidence contained in the court documents indicates that the pattern of collusion is consistent
with the operation of a cartel, but that the cartel was probably not all-inclusive, with competitive bids
also playing a large role. It is reasonable to conjecture that GIC brokers played a major role in coor-
dinating the cartel, and they themselves might have been pre-selected by the cartel taking into account
preferences of the municipalities. If the competitive “fringe” were small and unimportant, while the
cartel had had overwhelming market power, there would be little need to resort to tactics such as last
bid lookups. It may have been sufficient for the cartel to pre-select the winner, and then force the
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minimal interest rate acceptable to the municipality by soliciting several courtesy bids in order for the
solicitation be deemed competitive. The presence of the last lookup in the cases identified in the court
documents indicates that, at least in some cases, the solicitations also involved competitive bids. In
other words, both competition and collusion likely played an important role.
In the collusive schemes identified in the court documents, the auction was (or should have been)
conducted according to the first-price, sealed-bid format. The winning bidder always paid its bid. The
alleged coordination of bids by brokers, in the presence of some competitive (non-cartel) bids, required
at times frequent updating of cartel bids to ensure that the cartel would win at the lowest possible rate,
while the courtesy bids would remain within a certain range (within 100 basis points would provide a
safe harbour to the issuers).
Our dataset, described in more details in the next section, involves open auctions conducted over
the Internet, rather than sealed-bid auctions coordinated through a broker. The open nature of such
auctions is meant to attract more competition. In some allegations7, brokers actively sought to restrict
competition by artificially raising the cost of entry.
As any prospective bidder may simply register through the website, rather than through the broker,
the barriers to entry are likely to be lower in Internet open auctions. Also, Grant Street Group imple-
ments the closed-exit rule, according to which the bidders only see the status of their bid (winning or
not), but not the bids of other bidders. This rule makes operating the cartel more difficult since should
a deviation occur, it would not be detectable in the current auction.
It could still be possible to collude in open Internet GIC auctions. First, all bids are publicly dis-
closed after the auction. So a deviation could be detected after the auction and the deviator could be
punished in a repeated game. Second, even though bidders might not be able to coordinate their bids
on the auction website, they could still use other means of communication such as telephone or email.
Ultimately, whether or not the open Internet auctions have succeeded in overcoming potential collusion
is an empirical question. In the next section, we show how our tests can be used to answer this important
question.
7cite the CDR case
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3.3 Dataset
We employ a dataset of 215 Internet GIC auctions conducted over the period October 2000 - Decem-
ber 2008. Thus the dataset covers both the pre-investigation period and two years into the investigation.
This dataset was obtained from the website of Grant Street Group that administers these auctions on
behalf of bond issuers. For each auction, our data include the following information: Issuer’s name,
brief description of the contract, auction date, bidder name/ticker, bid rate offered, principal amount. In
addition, we have also extracted data on yields for two long-term US T-bills, the 10- and 20-year bills,
matched with the time that each auction took place. In our empirical exercise, however, we control
for the heterogeneity by estimating a fixed-effects regression, and only use the data on bids and bidder
identities. In order to control for auction heterogeneity, we have also collected data on yields for two
long-term US T-bills, the 10- and 20-year bills. The yields were matched with auction dates to control
for the market conditions on the day of the auction.8
The auctions are conducted as ascending-bid and closed-exit. This means that the participants only
observe the current status of their bids, either winning or losing. A losing bid is automatically rejected,
but can be updated to a higher bid at any future instance. If a bidder enters a bid higher than the current
winning bid, then this bidder becomes the current winner and is informed of this fact. However, other
bidders do not observe the current winning bid, nor are they informed about the identity of the current
winner.
The data indicate that bidders in the GIC auctions are cognizant of their incentives. Indeed, the
wide majority of these auctions result in tight races where bids are raised by the smallest allowable
increment. See Figure 3.1 for one example of such a race.9 Three bidders participated: Aegon NV,
a major Dutch financial services company, Rabobank, a major Dutch-based international bank, and
Trinity LLC, owned by the financial arm of General Electric Inc. The auction was won by Trinity LLC.
Two facts are notable. First, not all bids are submitted in the smallest increments. The initial bids by
8Unfortunately, our data does not include contract durations that would allow a more precise matching with the corre-
sponding treasury yield. However, given the relatively long-term nature of the underlying municipal bonds, it is reasonable to
expect that the aforementioned Treasury yields would provide a decent approximation.
9The image containing the figure was downloaded from the Grant Street Group’s website, http://www.grantstreet
.com/auctions/results.
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Aegon NV have large increments. However, these are essentially non-serious bids as they would have
little chance of winning in the prevailing market conditions. The majority of serious bids are in fact
submitted in the smallest increments. This particular auction illustrates a general phenomenon observed
in GIC Internet auctions: the wide majority of these auctions conform closely to the button model.
Figure 3.2 exhibits a histogram of a measure of jump bidding, the money left on the table. This is
simply the difference between the winning bid and the second-highest. There is a pronounced spike at
(approximately) 0, and as well pronounced clustering around 0. More than 80% of all auctions have the
money left on the table amounting to less than 5 percentage points.
The total raw number of participants is equal to 43. However, these raw bidders were aggregated
since several bidder groups in fact belonged to a single corporate entity. As a result of this aggregation,
the final list of bidders, reported in Table 3.2, contained 30 bidders. Table 3.2 exhibits the identities
of the bidders, along with the number of bids submitted. The average bid rate is 3.87 with a standard
deviation of 1.42. The maximum bid is 6.55. The minimum number of bidders in an auction is 2, and
the maximum is 13, with the average being 7 bids.
3.4 De-censoring Approach (Independent Case)
3.4.1 Empirical Results
In order to implement our collusion test assuming independence, we need to know the identity of
at least one competitive bidder. In order to increase the precision of our estimates, it is in fact desirable
to have several competitive bidders, so that the highest bid among them reveals the valuation of the
losing cartel leader relatively often. In Table 3.2, we identify for each bidder whether or not it was on
the defendant list in (i) CAC, (ii) SCAC and (iii) the Los Angeles complaint. As can be seen, the Los
Angeles complaint provides the most extensive list, overlapping to some extent with the list on CAC
complaint. The SCAC list, on the other hand, is much smaller subset of CAC.
For the purposes of our collusion test, we decided to use the list of firms in any of the complaints
mentioned in Table 3.2 as our collusive superset Ncol. In order to remove the effect of auction hetero-
geneity, both observed and unobserved, we follow Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) and Bajari, Houghton,
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and Tadelis (2014) and estimate a fixed-effects regression with auction-level fixed effects. We then ap-
ply our procedure to the residuals of this regression.
To begin illustrating our procedure, we have picked Rabobank as the alleged conspirator, as the bank
that has submitted most bids among all alleged conspirators. Figure 3.3 shows the estimated CDFs
for Rabobank. The blue curve is the empirical CDF of Rabobank’s estimated residuals in the fixed-
effect regression. The red curve is the predicted CDF assuming Rabobank is competitive, estimated
by following our de-censoring approach. The figure shows that the CDFs are actually quite close to
each other, and cross several times. There is no visual evidence of stochastic dominance as would be
if Rabobank colluded. Our test of collusion has a p-value of 0.26, which implies that the hypothesis of
the competitive behavior for Rabobank cannot be rejected at the customary levels of confidence.
3.4.2 Holm-Bonferroni Test
Next, we have implemented the Holm-Bonferroni test. Numerically, we have found our estimator
to be unreliable for banks that have submitted fewer than 40 bids, so only 9 banks with the number
of bids above this threshold were included. The test results are shown in Table 3.3. There is one
participant (XL Capital with a p-value= 3%) for whom the p-value is individually significant at the 5%
level. However, it does not pass the rejection cutoff of the Holm-Bonferroni procedure. At customary
significance levels, the test does not reject competition.10
3.5 Copula-Based Approach (Dependent Case)
As outlined in the second chapter, we propose a copula-based approach to establish identification
and estimation of model primitives within English auctions under the absence of independence, which
is implemented in this section. Copula-based methodology is implemented here to recover and estimate
linear and non-linear association between the variables of interest due to its ability it can parametrize
the link between the variables in a joint distribution. Finally, we apply a semi-parametric strategy, based
10The Holm-Bonferroni adjusted p-value is 0.27.
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on Archimedean copulae, to identify and estimate the model primitives and take into account the corre-
lation between bids. One advantage that this approach has is that it allows us to separate the estimation
of the marginal distribution from the estimation of the joint distribution of underlying bidder values.
Finally, we will allow us to uncover the unobservable latent value distributions using our sample data.
3.5.1 Empirical Results
In the application of copula theory, as formulated in the second chapter, our initial goal is to select a
copula among the Archimedean class that is flexible enough, allowing any level of positive dependence,
while it will accurately capture the dependency structure for each pair of variables. Therefore, we have
used the Clayton copula in our empirical test for convenience, however we can easily generalize this
to any other copula type in the Archimedean class without loss of generality. The Clayton copula also
allows for independence, treated as a special case. As in the independence case, we need to have at least
one competitive bidder in the data. We will use the list of allegedly colluding firms outlined in Table 3
as our collusive superset. Initially, we need to estimate the copula parameter, θ, in order to replace its
unknown counterpart in the generator function. Using our main estimating equation for θ and replacing
the unknown distributions with their empirical counterparts from the sample, we obtain bidder-level
estimator θˆi. After estimating the individual parameters for each bidder, we obtain the bidder-invariant
copula parameter of 0.55 for our test, by estimating a weighted average across bidders. Subsequently,
we can use the estimator obtained in the previous step θˆ to predict the counterfactual distributions - in
other words, how would the collusive firms behave if they were competitive. If the bidder is competitive,
then the counterfactual and actual distributions will coincide. However, if the bidder is collusive, we
show that the counterfactual competitive bid distribution stochastically dominates the actual collusive
one. Hence, we apply this statistical test of the null hypothesis of competitive bidding against the
alternative of collusive bidding on each individual bidder.
As we have discussed it in the independent case, we take into account the fact that it is probable to
observe auctions where non-homogenous objects are auctioned off. Once again, we control for observed
and unobserved heterogeneity by incorporating the approach used Bajari et al. (2010) and Bajari et
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al. (2014), and estimate a fixed-effects regression with auction-level fixed effects. This regression is
estimated parametrically, and our estimators are applied to the homogenized bids resulting from this
regression.
We have picked Salomon as the alleged cartel member for illustration purposes. Figure 3.4 illus-
trates the estimated cumulative distribution functions for Salomon, with the blue curve depicting the
empirical CDF, and the red curve depicting the counterfactual or predicted CDF assuming the exhibi-
tion of competitive behaviour of the bidder in question. We can see that the two curves overlap for the
most part, without evidence of stochastic dominance or indicators of collusive behaviour. In sum, once
we account for dependence in our model, we obtain a much closer match between the actual empirical
distribution function of values and the predicted one obtained in our model. As we see in 3.4, the esti-
mated curves are strikingly close to each other, in line in what we found for the independent case. Once
again, there is no visual evidence of stochastic dominance implying collusion.
3.5.2 Holm-Bonferroni Test
We used the Holm-Bonferroni procedure to test for testing sequential testing procedure that we now
describe. Let α denote the overall significance level. As in the de-censoring approach, we are only
including banks that have submitted more than 40 bids, hence only 9 banks with the number of bids
above this threshold were included. We conduct the procedure on the bids from the original sample,
and adjusted bids controlling for heterogeneity. The test results are shown in Table 3.4 and 3.5. At
customary significance levels, using original bid data, the test does not reject competition. Once tested
with adjusted bids, there are two bidders (Salomon with a p-value = 0.5%, and Morgan Stanley with
a p-value = 0.25% ) for whom the p-value is individually significant at the 5% level, hence we do not
reject collusive behaviour for these two bidders. However, since total number of bids submitted by both
is not significant overall, it is unlikely that this pair of bidders would form a cartel. Therefore, we reject
collusive behaviour for the adjusted sample as well.
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3.6 Concluding remarks
Based on this empirical study of the municipal GIC auctions, we conclude that despite the fact
that there have been allegations of collusion in this market, our test does not detect deviations from
competition. Both methodologies that we have implemented in this empirical study have produced
consistent results with the aforementioned conclusion. A plausible explanation of this finding is that
the Internet auction design involves very limited information disclosure.
All in all, whether or not the open Internet GIC auctions have been successful in achieving the
goal of combatting collusion is an interesting empirical question investigated in our paper. We take
advantage of the fact that the set of alleged conspirators in GIC auctions can be determined from court
case filings for non-Internet auctions. Our test finds no evidence of collusive behavior.
Finally, the research in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. Below, we discuss
three important but challenging extensions.
First, we restrict attention to English auctions. Can our approach be extended to another popular
format, first-price auctions (FPA)? In English auctions, bidders stay in the auction up to their valuations.
As we have shown, this crucial feature allows one to identify the the distribution of valuations of a given
bidder regardless of whether other bidders are colluding and who participates in the cartel. In FPAs,
bidders bid less than their values, and the competitive bids depend on whether there is a cartel, and on the
cartel composition. A combination of our approach with the identification and estimation methodology
for first-price auctions proposed in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) is clearly desirable.
The second extension concerns relaxation of the efficient cartel hypothesis. While many papers
in the empirical auction literature assume efficient collusion, this is obviously a limitation. This is
not always the case when bidders are asymmetric. Asker (2010) has recently estimated a structural
model of a knockout auction for a stamp dealer cartel and found evidence of inefficient allocation.
Incorporating richer leader selection rules supported is desirable and left for future work. As Asker
(2010) has demonstrated for a postal stamp cartel, a cartel large enough to exercise market power
may include bidders that are quite different, and may adopt a knockout auction that leads to inefficient
allocation. If the form of the knockout auction is known to the researcher, one could use this information
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to extend our approach. More specifically, given the distributions of valuations, any cartel mechanism
determines the leader selection probabilities. And vise versa, given the leader selection probabilities,
the value distributions could be identified using our approach. This fixed-point reasoning opens up
a way to identify the distributions of valuations of the members of the (potentially inefficient) cartel.
However, this may be challenging not least because knockout auctions with asymmetric bidders may
be difficult to solve even numerically. This extension is left for future research.
Third, our approach relies on the button model of the English auction, which as we have argued, is
applicable to recent Internet auction designs with minimal information disclosure, where bidders only
see the status of their bid (winning or losing). The auction format provides incentives for bidders to
bid up to their true values. Indeed, it is easy to see that that the closed-exit format matches exactly
the button-, or thermometer-auction paradigm first proposed in Vickrey (1961), where bidding own
valuation is a weakly-dominant strategy. Moreover, the closed-exit rule ensures that this equilibrium is
unique. In particular, the model is suitable for our empirical application. In this model, it is a dominant
strategy for a bidder to drop out at its valuation. Haile and Tamer (2003) argue that this assumption is
unrealistic in traditional English auctions and develop sharp nonparametric bounds on the distributions
of valuations when it does not hold. Whether or not their bounding approach could be extended to




November, 2006 FBI allegedly rides the offices and seizes documents of financial broker firms Ru-
bin/Chambers, Dunhill Insurance Services (CDR), Investment Management Advisory Group
(IMAGE), and Sound Capital Management Inc.
December, 2006 DOJ Antitrust brought their case to the Southern District Court of New York (S.D.C.N.Y.).
January, 2007 One of the defendants, Bank of America, enters into the DOJ leniency program. Subse-
quently, several municipalities filed complaints to various courts.
August, 2008 Consolidated Class Action Complaint (CAC) filed against more than 40 corporate defendants.
However, the defendants almost immediately filed a motion to dismiss.
April, 2009 The S.D.C.N.Y. granted the defendants their motion, citing lack of factual evidence.
June, 2009 The CAC plaintiffs filed Second Class Action Complaint (SCAC) against a smaller list of
defendants. The defendants immediately respondent with a motion to dismiss.
September, 2009 The City of Los Angeles files a first amended complaint against a number of corporate de-
fendants, including both GIC providers and brokers.
March, 2010 The S.D.C.N.Y. denied the SCAC defendants’ motion.
December, 2010 Bank of America settles for $137 million.
May, 2011 One of the defendants in SCAC, UBS AG, agrees to settle and pay $160 million for its
anticompetitive conduct in the municipal derivative market.
July, 2011 Defendant JP Morgan Chase Inc., agrees to settle and pay $228 million for its anticompetitive
conduct in the municipal derivative market.
December, 2011 Defendant GE Funding Capital Market Services Inc. agrees to settle and pay $70 million for
its anticompetitive conduct in the municipal derivative market.
January, 2012 An executive and former executive of CDR pleaded guilty for participating in bid rigging.
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Table 3.2: Internet Auction Participants
Complaints:
Bidder Number of bids CAC SCAC Los Angeles
ABN AMRO 4
AEGON 144
AMBAC Capital Funding 14
American Internation Group, Inc. 140 X X
Bank of America 8 X X X
Bayerische Landesbank 103 X




Financial Guaranty Insurance Co. LLC 22 X X
Financial Security Assurance Ltd. 49 X X
First Union National Bank 8
GE Funding Capital Market Services, Inc. 20 X
HSBC Bank 11
Hypo Real Estate Bank 63
ING Bank 9
JP Morgan Chase 13 X X X
Lehman Brothers 4
MBIA Inc. 70 X
Merrill Lynch Inc. 10 X X
Morgan Stanley 30 X X X
Natixis S.A. 48 X X X
Rabobank 138 X
Royal Bank of Canada 8
Societe Generale SA 49 X X X
UBS AG 1 X X X
Wells Fargo 7 X
Westdeutsche Landesbank 11
XL Capital 42 X X
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Table 3.3: Test Results (Independent Case)
Bidder name p-value Holm-Bonferroni cutoff
XL Capital 0.03 0.006
Rabobank 0.24 0.006
American International Group Inc. 0.33 0.007
Natixis 0.35 0.008
FSA 0.38 0.010
Bayerische Landesbank 0.52 0.013
Salomon 0.71 0.017
MBIA 1 0.025
Morgan Stanley 1 0.050
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Table 3.4: Test Results - Raw Bids (Dependent Case)
Bidder name p-value Holm-Bonferroni cutoff
Salomon (Citigroup) 0.01 0.006
Morgan Stanley 0.0175 0.006
American International Group Inc. 0.0475 0.007
Natixis 0.06 0.008
Bayerische Landesbank 0.0875 0.010
MBIA 0.11 0.013




Table 3.5: Test Results - Adjusted Bids (Dependent Case)
Bidder name p-value Holm-Bonferroni cutoff
Morgan Stanley 0.0025 0.00556
Salomon (Citigroup) 0.005 0.00625
XL Capital 0.0075 0.007
Natixis 0.0275 0.008
American International Group Inc. 0.0475 0.010
MBIA 0.0775 0.013
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Figure 3.4: Salomon: Predicted competitive (red) vs. actual (blue) CDFs of bids.
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